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Lawful Personal Use
Jessica Litman*
We are perfectly fine with personal use.
-Mitch Bainwol, Recording Industry Association of America, 20051
Despite having sued more than 20,000 of its customers,2 the recording
industry wants the world to know that it has no complaint with personal use.
Copyright lawyers of all stripes agree that copyright includes a free zone in
which individuals may make personal use of copyrighted works without legal
liability. 3 Unlike other nations, though, the United States hasn't drawn the
borders of its lawful personal use zone by statute.4
Determining the
circumstances under which personal use of copyrighted works will be
deemed lawful is essentially a matter of inference and analogy, and
differently striped copyright lawyers will differ vehemently on whether a
particular personal use is lawful or infringing.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. An unusually large number of people have
helped me come to grips with this topic. I owe particular thanks to Jon Weinberg, Graeme
Dinwoodie, Nina Mendelson, Julie Cohen, Pamela Samuelson, Rebecca Tushnet, Roberta Kwall,
Joseph Liu, Sara Stadler, Jonathan Cohen, Kenneth Alfano, Peggy Radin, and Jane Ginsburg whose
questions caused me to rethink crucial questions and come up with different answers. I also want to
thank Claire Chandler for showing uncommon patience.
1. Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., State of the Union
Panel Discussion at the Future of Music Coalition Fifth Annual Policy Summit (Sept. 12, 2005),
availableat http://www.futureofmusic.org/audio/summit05/panel04.stateofunion.mp3.
2. Jefferson Graham, RIAA Chief Says Illegal Song-Sharing "Contained," USA TODAY, June
13, 2006, at BI, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2006-06-12-riaa
_x.htm; Electronic Frontier Foundation, How to Not Get Sued for File Sharing, http://www.eff.org/
IP/P2P/howto-notgetsued.php.
3. Professor Marci Hamilton coined the phrase "free use zone" to describe these uses. See
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615 (1996) ("While the corporeal universe has permitted Western societies
to receive and copy large numbers of copyrighted works for free ... the on-line era raises the
possibility that the publishing industry can track every minuscule use of a work and thereby turn the
free use zone into a new opportunity for profit.").
4. Two examples of the many countries with statutory personal use provisions are Canada and
Norway. See, e.g., BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, [2004] F.C. 488 (Fed. Ct.) (applying the Canadian
Copyright Act to determine "downloading a song for personal use does not amount to
infringement"); Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, The Notion of Private Copying in Nordic Copyright
Legislation in the Light of European Developments DuringRecent Years, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 1003, 1003 (2002) ("Copying for private use has traditionally been free in all Nordic
copyright legislations.").
5. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE

INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000) [hereinafter THE DIGITAL DILEMMA] ("The extremes of the
positions on this issue are well established .... Some rights holders... believe that all ...
unauthorized reproduction of their works, whether private or public, commercial or noncommercial,
is an infringement.
Many members of the general public.., believe that all ... private,
noncommercial copying of copyrighted works is lawful."). Compare,e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel,
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The dispute is not simply a question of where one lives on the copyright
food chain. The contours of lawful personal use are fuzzy as well as
contested.6 Every time a study of copyright law queries the scope of lawful
personal use, it concludes that the answer to the question whether any particular personal use is lawful is indeterminate. 7 Wherever the fuzzy borders
of lawful personal use lie, however, most would agree that the lawful personal use zone is shrinking.
Congress has significantly expanded the breadth of copyright protection
in the past few decades; some of that expansion has come at the expense of
personal use.8 The proliferation of digital technology has made personal use
both easier to track, trace, and charge for, 9 and a more formidable threat to
conventional commercial exploitation of copyrights.' 0 Copyright owners
have therefore launched a variety of initiatives to replace unmetered and unmonitored personal uses with licensed ones. They have demanded the
restraint of unauthorized personal use as a necessary step in encouraging the
new commercial services to flourish.'" Meanwhile, individuals' claims to
make personal copies and pass them on to friends and family seem more

Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 300 (1996) ("[C]ourts have
generally declined to find personal copying as infringing."), with Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having
Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 113, 120 (2003) ("U.S. and international copyright law have increasingly
recognized that the author's right to authorize, or at least to be compensated for, the making of
copies, extends.., to end-users who make individual copies for private consumption.").
6. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 338, 338-50 (2002)
[hereinafter Litman, War Stories] ("[T]he question whether individuals are liable for copyright
infringement when they make unauthorized uses of copyrighted works has no clear answer.").
7. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY
CHALLENGES THE LAW 5, 5-14 (1989) ("The problem of private use arises because its legal status
is ambiguous."); THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 5, at 135, 129-36 ("This report cannot resolve
the debate over private use copying."); Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in 2 STUDIES
ON COPYRIGHT 781, 789-90 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S. ed., 1963); Borge Varmer,
Photoduplication of Copyrighted Material by Libraries, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra, at
813, 817 ("It may be that copying for one's own private use... is sanctioned by custom ... ").
8. E.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(a)-(b), 111 Stat. 2678, 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506);
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 801-05, 104 Stat.
5089, 5134-37 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109); Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109).
9. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy,9 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE)
1, 7 (2004-2005) ("[P]rivate entities have successfully monitored transmissions in cyberspace to
control uses of their copyrighted materials."); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in
Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 606, 602-13 (1997) [hereinafter Litman,
Reforming Information Law] ("[T]he Internet has made it simpler to prevent, detect and avenge
unauthorized copying.").
10. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 114, 113-14 ("[D]igital media and communications
made it even easier for consumers to create physical copies of any kind of work .... ").
11. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691, 693-96 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(describing the entertainment industries' "broadcast flag" campaign).
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questionable when those copies are digital.12 Copyright owners have
insisted, with some success, that digital devices must be equipped with copy13
prevention technology before being made available to consumers.
Increasingly, what consumers have viewed as a "right" to make fair uses of
copyrighted works is painted as a historically and technologically contingent
privilege that may need to yield to copyright owners' new licensing
strategies. 14
Fifty years ago, copyright law rarely concerned itself with uses that
were not both commercial and public. 15 Twenty years ago, when the
Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 16 was still fresh, people believed they were free to use copyrighted works noncommercially, and the law for the most part backed up that
belief.' 7 Today, however, the recording industry has sued more than 20,000
12. See THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 5, at 129, 129-45 ("[T]he risk to rights holders
from unbridled private copying is especially acute when the information is in digital form and can
be copied without loss of quality and disseminated by digital networks."); Netanel, supra note 5, at
299, 299-301 ("With readily available consumer electronics and digital technology.., individual
consumers are now able to make perfect copies of many cultural works at virtually no cost.").
13. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436, 436-44 (2d Cir. 2001)
("The movie studios were reluctant to release movies in digital form until they were confident they
had in place adequate safeguards against piracy of their copyrighted movies."); see also Electronic
Frontier Foundation, EFF: The Battle for Your Digital Media Devices, http://www.eff.org/IP/
fairuse/ ("Major entertainment companies are locking up the audio and video content you own and
taking away your rights."); Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF: Endangered Gizmos!,
http://www.eff.org/endangered/ (illustrating new technologies that are threatened because of their
copying ability).
14. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Exclusive Right to Their Writings": Copyright and
Control in the Digital Age, 54 ME. L. REV. 195, 201, 201-02 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Copyright and Control] ("[T]he ... statutory and caselaw history until 1976 often elevated claims
for enhanced availability.., over copyright owner interest ....
The 1976 Act, however,
implements a vision of 'exclusive rights' to which control is integral." (footnote omitted));
Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 124 ("As we move to an access-based world of distribution of
copyrighted works, a copyright system that neglected access controls would make copyright
illusory, and in the long run it would disserve consumers."); see also U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PUBLIC HEARING ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES INVOLVED

IN THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE 40-50 (1993) (remarks of Bruce A.
Lehman, Chair, Working Group on Intellectual Property), available at http://www.umich.edu/
~jdlitman/NOV18NII.TXT (suggesting that fair use may be unnecessary in an electronic
environment).
15. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 35
(1994) ("[T]he public believes that the copyright statute.., does not reach private or noncommercial conduct ....
Until recently ... the public's impression was not a bad approximation of
the scope of copyright rights likely, in practice, to be enforced."); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright
and Freedom of Expression in HistoricalPerspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 326 (2003) ("For
the most part, the law of copyright has regulated public and commercial uses of copyrighted works,
not private and noncommercial uses.").
16. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970, 970-71
(9th Cir. 1992) ("Game Genie users are engaged in a non-profit activity. Their use of the Game
Genie to create derivative works therefore is presumptively fair."); Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio
Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A CriticalAnalysis, 16

HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1873 2006-2007

1874

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 85:1871

individuals for making personal uses that can be characterized as
"commercial" only by redefining commercial to mean "unlicensed." Today,
trading music with your friends is called "piracy" and collecting photocopied
articles relevant to your job is stealing. 18 Today, it's a major concession
when the lawyer representing the recording industry acknowledges to the
Supreme Court that it is lawful for twenty-two million iPod owners to use
them to listen to music they've copied from recordings they have
purchased.19
Whether the shrinking of lawful personal use should disturb us depends
on whether personal use has intrinsic value. If personal use was once lawful
solely because of enforcement difficulties, the easy enforcement of copyright
prerogatives against individuals for unlicensed personal uses is yet another
benefit of technological progress. If the only factors discouraging us from
welcoming the reduction in the scope of lawful personal use are concerns for
the collateral damage to our privacy arising from vigorous enforcement of
copyright within the home, or the effects of reduced access on social
equality, we could address those fears directly by legislating new privacy
rights or encouraging the adoption of innovative pricing models.
If those suggestions fail to quell the queasiness you feel at the idea that
fewer and fewer personal uses remain lawful, then perhaps we've overlooked
some role that personal use plays in the copyright system. Missing such a
thing would certainly be understandable. We tend not to talk much about
personal use when we're considering copyright reform.2 ° Personal users
have historically found fervent advocates in copyright law discussions only
when they're employing consumer electronic devices, and only from the
manufacturers of those devices. 21 Although copyright scholarship has
wrestled with the lawfulness of personal uses since Universal Studios sued to

HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 317, 317-21 (1994) ("The arguments for and against finding
home taping a fair use will not be repeated at length since not only have such arguments been
presented many times before, but also [the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992] makes the debate

irrelevant by deeming noncommercial taping a noninfringing activity." (footnote omitted)).
18. See Litman, War Stories, supra note 6, at 342-50 (tracing the evolution in language used to
describe contested uses of copyrighted works).
19. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_
arguments/argument transcripts/04-480.pdf.
20. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275,
354, 348-54 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Technological Change] ("[Members of Congress] have...
demonstrated little eagerness for grappling with the general problems that private use poses.").
21. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 59-61, 122-45 (2006) [hereinafter LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT] (reviewing the legislative history of the Audio Home Recording Act and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The
Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1841 (2006) ("[Sony]
also argued that time-shift copying was a fair use and that Congress had intended to exempt private
use home taping from radio or TV from claims of copyright infringement.").
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enjoin the Sony Betamax,22 we've had some difficulty coming up with useful
formulations. As copyright law has expanded to encompass more and more
territory, our vocabulary to describe the remainder has seemed to shrink as
well.
Particular scholars have sought to infuse the debate with a more
nuanced analysis. Professors Julie Cohen,2 3 Yochai Benkler,2 4 Rebecca
Tushnet,2 5 and Neil Netanel,26 among others, have attempted to derive legal
principles that protect the interests of those who experience, rather than
create, copyrighted works from the First Amendment. 27 Professor L. Ray
Patterson, among others, found users' rights in the copyright and patent
clause of the Constitution. 28 Professors Joseph Liu and Glynn Lunney,

22. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1652-57 (1982)
(analyzing home videotaping as a case of market failure); L. Ray Patterson, FreeSpeech, Copyright,
and FairUse, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40 (1987) ("A fair use doctrine intended to permit competitors
to make reasonable use of a work is quite different from a fair use doctrine that makes a consumer's
use of the work for ordinary purposes suspect.").
23. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudenceof Self-help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1089 (1998) (discussing users' rights to hack DRM); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:
A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996)
[hereinafter Cohen, A Right to Read] (discussing right to read anonymously).
24. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 393 (1999) (suggesting a First
Amendment basis for a user's right of access to the public domain); Yochai Benkler, From
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons
and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000) (arguing that First Amendment interests require
regulators to ensure broad public access to the tools for generating and disseminating expression);
Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the
Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, at 173 (2003) (articulating First
Amendment constraints on Congress's power to restrict individual rights to read and speak).
25. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004) ("Courts should recognize that various
kinds of copying.., promote free speech.... The point is not to denigrate fair use, but to
recognize that many kinds of uses of copyrighted material may be justified ....").
26. See generally Netanel, supra note 5 (analyzing conflicts between the First Amendment and
copyright, and suggesting resolutions).
27. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891,
904 (2002) ("The expressive liberty protected by the First Amendment encompasses copying as a
way of receiving or preserving personal access ... and distributing copies as a means of
communicating to others what the distributor wants to communicate."); Malla Pollack, The
Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the FirstAmendment and the OriginalProgress Clause
(A.K.A. Copyright and Patent Clause), 45 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 27 (2004) ("The Clause limits
Congress, demonstrating that the base right is in the public, not in the government, the inventors,
nor the writers."); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom ofImagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 38 (2002) ("Because it protects the freedom of imagination, the First Amendment
directly protects not only speakers, but readers, viewers, and listeners as well."); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 326 (2004) ("Speech requires content to be meaningful. This includes
some ability to acquire such content and certainly the privilege of using it.").
28. See L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences,
8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 228 (2001) ("[T]he governing principle of both the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause is the right of public access to materials that enable the people to learn, for
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among others, have suggested that we find a theoretical basis for protecting
consumers within the four comers of copyright law itself.29 Both Cohen and
Liu have criticized as reductionist the common depictions of users in the
copyright literature and have sought to refine our understanding of how the
interests of users and consumers have been underappreciated in current copyright law and copyright legal scholarship.3 °
In the summer of 2005, the unanimous Supreme Court decision in MGM
v. Grokster31 caused the unsettled issue of personal use to assume increased
importance. 32 The decision drew a line between the distributors of technology that makes infringement easier who would be liable for their customers'
infringing use and the distributors of like technology who would not.33 The
difference, the Court held, lay in whether the distributors had promoted infringing or noninfringing use. 34 To assess likely contributory liability we
need to know what personal uses are infringing. That question is more
pressing because the recording and motion picture industries, which initially
painted their suits against individuals as a last resort given the lower court
rulings in Grokster's favor,3 5 have apparently found the practice of suing
hundreds of peer-to-peer file sharers each month too delicious a habit to

political purposes in some instances, and for personal education in others."); Patterson, supra note
22, at 61 ("The copyright owner, by reason of the Copyright Act and the copyright clause, has not
only no right to interfere, but a duty not to interfere with the consumer's use of a publicly
disseminated work."); see also Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in
Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2001) (arguing that the policies underlying the copyright
and patent clause support the enactment of a personal use privilege).
29. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 398
(2003) ("After all, the overall purpose of the Copyright Act is not to reward authors for authors'
sake, but to reward authors to benefit consumers and society more generally."); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002) ("With the
development and dissemination of digital technology, the importance of private copying and its
legal status, whether fair or unfair under copyright law, has only increased.").
30. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347,
347-48 (2005) ("Copyright doctrine, however, is characterized by the absence of the user....
[This] absence produces a domino effect that ripples through the structure of copyright law, shaping
both its unquestioned rules and its thorniest dilemmas."); Liu, supra note 29, at 398 ("[C]onsumer
interests are quite a bit more complex than we ordinarily think.").
31. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
32. See Jonathan Band, So What Does Inducement Mean?, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Nov.
2005, at 1, 2 ("[T]his redefinition of contributory infingement... appears to run contrary to the
Supreme Court's discussion of contributory infringement in Sony.").
33. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-40.
34. Id. at 937-39.
35. See Pornography, Technology and Process: Problems and Solutions on Peer-to-Peer
Networks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Cary
Sherman, President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=902 ("[Flor copyright owners, the John Doe procedure is
a lose-lose: they no longer have access to an expeditious procedure for identifying alleged infringers
and they are faced with significantly greater administrative and monetary burdens associated with
enforcing their rights under the law.").
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break.36 The suits generate a few thousand dollars each and may have some
deterrent value. 37 The economics of defending them make it unlikely that
individual defendants will choose to litigate. 38 We therefore face the prospect that thousands of consumers will pay stiff peer-to-peer taxes to the
recording and motion picture industry each year without a meaningful chance
to establish whether they are doing something illegal. 39 Nor should we feel
confident that the assault on personal use will stop at peer-to-peer file
sharing. Flush from its victory over Grokster, the recording industry
changed its tune and explained that the copyright piracy threat posed by peerto-peer file sharing was insignificant compared with the threat posed by unauthorized CD burning, and that the industry was rolling out copy-protected
CDs to meet the threat.4 ° Meanwhile, both the motion picture industry and
the recording industry seek laws requiring consumer electronics companies
to incorporate copy prevention technology into digital televisions and
radios. 4' Thus, the effort to capture control over personal uses is moving
further and further into consumers' homes.42
36. See, e.g., Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., RIAA Launches New Initiatives
Targeting Campus Music Theft (Feb. 28, 2007), availableat http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/
022807.asp ("The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), on behalf of the major
record companies, today sent 400 pre-litigation settlement letters to 13 different universities. Each
letter informs the school of a forthcoming copyright infringement lawsuit against one of its students
or personnel.").
37. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers and the Dilemma of
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 744, 747-50 (2005)

(suggesting that the "John Doe" suits deter some file sharing and may, in addition, become a profit
center for the recording industry).
38. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 917, 958 (2005)
[hereinafter Litman, Sony Paradox] ("[O]nly one of the 8000 consumers sued so far for peer-topeer file sharing by the recording industry has found the arguments in favor of personal copying
sufficiently compelling to be worth the risk of taking the law suit to trial.").
39. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 3, Grokster, 545
U.S. 913 (No. 04-480) ("[T]he right of private copying, which has existed (as a matter of legal
realism) for years, may well be lost not through a fair and vigorously contested adversary process,
but through silence.").
40. See Mitch Bainwol, CEO, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Address at the Nat'l Ass'n of
Recording Merchandisers Insights and Sounds Convention 2005, Building a Brighter Future:
Making and Selling Great Music, at 58 (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.narm.com/2005Convention/
Bainwol.pdf ("Burning and Ripping Are Becoming A Greater Threat Than P2P"). The copyprotection software has not been entirely benign. In 2005, Sony BMG released a number of
recordings on CDs that incorporated copy-protection technology. The CDs played normally in a
conventional CD player, but, when inserted into a CD-ROM drive of a computer running the
Windows operating system, the CDs automatically and secretly installed software on the user's
computer. Press Release, FTC, Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges (Jan. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/sony.htm. The Federal Trade Commission charged Sony BMG
with violating federal law, claiming that the software "Posed Security Risks, Limited CD Use, and
Monitored Users' Listening Habits on their Computers, Without Consumer Consent." Id. Sony
settled the charges in January of 2007. Id.
41. See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Commission
adopted 'broadcast flag' regulations, requiring that digital television receivers ... include
technology allowing them to recognize the broadcast flag."); Broadcast and Audio Flag: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,109th Cong. 47 (2006), available
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This Article seeks to refocus the discussion of users' and consumers'
rights under copyright, by placing people who make personal use of
copyright works at the center of the copyright system. The view of copyright
that such a reconfiguration permits yields some useful insights. It allows us
to look at nineteenth and twentieth century copyright cases in a new light.
Rather than viewing those opinions as decisions by common law judges construing statutes stingily,43 we can appreciate them as interpretations informed
by a view of copyright in which readers and listeners were as important as
authors and publishers.
I propose in this Article to look at the place of readers, listeners,
viewers, and the general public in copyright through the lens of personal use.
After Grokster, the topic of personal use is timely, indeed critically so. Limiting myself to personal use, moreover, allows me to evade, for now, many of
the interesting questions that arise when readers, listeners, users, and experiencers morph into publishers and distributors. 4 Finally, personal use is a
realm where even the most rapacious copyright owners have always agreed
that some uses are lawful even though they are neither exempted or

at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bainwol-012406.pdf (hearing on proposals for legislation
directing the FCC to implement the broadcast flag); Anne Broache, Senators Aim to Restrict Net,
Satellite Radio Recording, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 16, 2007, http://news.com.com/2102-1028_36149915.html ("[Proposed legislation] says that all audio services... would be obligated to
implement 'reasonably available and economically reasonable' copy-protection technology aimed at
preventing 'music theft' and restricting automatic recording."); Electronic Frontier Foundation,
EFF: Broadcast Flag, http://www.eff.org/IP/broadcastflag/ ("[I]f the broadcast flag mandate is
passed, Hollywood and federal bureaucrats will get a veto over innovative devices and legitimate
uses of recorded programming. The mandate forces all future digital television (DTV) tuners to
include 'content protection' (aka DRM) technologies.").
42. See The Audio and Video Flags: Can Content Protection and Technological Innovation
Coexist?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 109th Cong.
40-70 (2006) (discussing the degree to which the proposed audio broadcast flag would impinge on
listeners' control of their radios); id. at 71 (statement of Fritz Attaway, Executive Vice President
and Special Policy Advisor, Motion Picture Association of America) ("Whether or not the [video
broadcast] flag is reinstituted, the vast majority of digital TV channels received by the American
public will be capable of protecting content against mass redistribution."); The Analog Hole: Can
Congress Protect Copyright and Promote Innovation?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 21, 2006) (statement of Dan Glickman, Chairman and CEO, Motion
Picture Association of America), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1956 ("[Wle can, and
must, implement basic technological measures ... to discourage what I call 'casual misuse' of our
intellectual property."); see also Platform Equality and Remedies for Rights Holders in Music Act
of 2007, S. 256, 110th Cong. (requiring radios and audio recorders to include content protection
technology).
43. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 980 (1990) [hereinafter
Litman, Public Domain] ("[Nineteenth century c]ourts interpreted the scope of the copyright grant
narrowly and continued to hold that what Congress did not grant to the author became common
property upon publication of the work containing it.").
44. For some of my thoughts on those questions, see Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 37
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. J.L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Litman, Sharing].
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privileged in the copyright statute nor recognized as legal by any judicial
decision.4 5
In Part II of this Article, I urge that reading, listening, viewing,
watching, playing, and using copyrighted works is at the core of the
copyright system. For most of its history, copyright law was designed to
maximize the opportunities for nonexploitative enjoyment of copyrighted
works in order to encourage reading, listening, watching, and their cousins. I
term the freedom to engage in those activities copyright liberties, and argue
that they are both deeply embedded in copyright's design and crucial to its
promotion of the "Progress of Science." In Part III, I revisit copyright cases
that have attracted criticism for their stingy construction of copyright
owners' property rights, and suggest that the courts' narrow reading of
copyright rights was motivated, at least in part, by their solicitude for the interests of readers and listeners. These courts sought to evaluate whether
accused uses were more akin to reading and listening than to publishing and
distributing, and they examined the potential impact of their decisions on
readers and listeners as well as authors and publishers. When a broad literal
reading of statutory language would have significantly burdened reading,
listening, and viewing, these courts resisted that interpretation of the statute.
In Part IV, I articulate a definition of personal use. Armed with that
definition, in Part V, I look at a range of personal uses that are
uncontroversially noninfringing under current law. I focus in particular on
personal uses that seem to fall within the literal terms of copyright owners'
exclusive rights, and seem to be excused by no statutory limitation, but
which are nonetheless generally considered to be lawful. I proceed in Parts
VI and VII to offer an alternative analysis of the scope of copyright owners'
rights and the lawfulness of personal uses that might invade them. Finally, in
Part VIII, I return to the conventional paradigm of copyright statutory
interpretation, under which all unlicensed uses are infringing unless excused.
I suggest that the rubric is not only inaccurate, but potentially destructive of
copyright's historic liberties.
I.

What Is Copyright Law for?

The copyright law... makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.
-United States v. ParamountPictures,Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
We sometimes talk and write about copyright law as if encouraging the
creation and dissemination of works of authorship were the ultimate goal,

45. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 623 ("There has been a cushion of 'free use' surrounding the
author's capacity to prohibit unauthorized or unpaid uses. Examples... include: browsing among
copyrighted books and magazines for sale in a bookstore, loaning a book to a friend, borrowing
copyrighted works from public libraries, and visiting an art gallery or museum."); infra text
accompanying notes 137-84.

HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1879 2006-2007

1880

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 85:1871

with nothing further required to "promote the Progress of Science. ' 46 We
have focused so narrowly on the production half of the copyright equation
that we have seemed to think that the Progress of Science is nothing more
than a giant warehouse filled with works of authorship. When we do this, we
miss, or forget, an essential step. In order for the creation and dissemination
of a work of authorship to mean anything at all, someone needs to read the
book, view the art, hear the music, watch the film, listen to the CD, run the
computer program, and build and inhabit the architecture.
This insight seems so obvious that it is surprising that it shows up so
rarely in the copyright laws, the legislative efforts to enact them, or the
scholarship that critiques them. The copyright interests of the readers,
viewers, listeners, watchers, builders, and inhabitants may get short shrift in
congressional hearings because they have so few paid representatives beyond
members of Congress themselves. Their absence until very recently from
copyright scholarship is more difficult to account for. The notion that copyright law's primary purpose is to benefit the public has been commonplace
for many years.47 The understanding that its mechanism was to enable works
of authorship to enrich the people who read, listened to, and viewed them has
appeared in many copyright cases.48 Yet copyright scholarship's recent
preoccupation with law and economics has translated those pronouncements
into assertions that the public will benefit when authors and distributors have
robust incentives to create and market works. 49 So long as people buy books
and CDs, who cares if they read or listen to them? Outlier scholars have
published books and articles seeking to argue that copyright law, properly
understood, places readers, listeners, and viewers at its center. 50 Those

46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 5, 3-9 (1989) ("The constitutional clause
empowering Congress to enact a copyright statute reflects the belief that property rights, properly
limited, will serve the general public interest in an abounding national culture."); ROBERT GORMAN,
COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1991) ("The basic purpose of copyright is to enrich our society's wealth of
culture and information.").
48. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors ....); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
49. See LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at 79-81 (describing the influence of the
economic incentive model of intellectual property on copyright theory and scholarship).
50. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A

LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 3-4 (1991) (stating that copyright should be viewed "as a law for
consumers as well as for creators and marketers"); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 267 (2002) ("[C]yberspace and the economics of digital technology require the
unbundling of the public's interests in the creation and distribution of digital works."); Lunney,
supra note 29, at 977 ("[I]ncreasing access to a work, even unauthorized access, represents a
sufficient public interest to invoke the fair use doctrine.").
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arguments, though, have for the most part been poorly received even by
copyright skeptics, who have viewed them as extreme. 5 1
Copyright law is intended to create a legal ecology that encourages the
creation and dissemination of works of authorship, and thereby "promote the
Progress of Science." As James Boyle has reminded us, ecologies are complex and interdependent systems.52 If we build shopping centers and housing
tracts on all of the marshes and frog ponds, we will eventually find ourselves
overrun with mosquitoes. In the same way, laws that discourage book reading end up being bad for book authors. Thus, it isn't difficult to frame an
argument that copyright law cannot properly encourage authors to create new
works if it imposes undue burdens on readers. Such arguments are more palatable to fans of strong copyright than arguments urging the primacy of
reading, and much of the scholarship urging limited copyright, my own
included,53 has relied on them.54 Those arguments, though, have been
vulnerable to the assertion that if strong copyright laws prove unfavorable to
authors because of the burdens they impose on readers, authors can always
exercise their options to waive some of their rights, or license them on easy
and generous terms. 55 Recent rejoinders have focused on the difficulties attending licensing.56 I want to resist the temptation to advance an argument

51. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30, at 348 ("I do not intend to argue that copyright is, as some
have asserted, 'a law of users' rights."' (citing PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 50)).
Copyright true believers have been even less receptive. For a strident and not entirely coherent
argument that users have and should have no rights whatsoever under copyright laws, see David R.
Johnstone, Debunking FairUse Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y U.S.A. 345, 357, 357-58 (2005) ("No 'Users'Rights' Exist (Explicitly or Implicitly)").
52. James Boyle had the insight that intellectual property laws created an information ecology.
See James Boyle, A Politics of IntellectualProperty: Environmentalismfor the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J.
87, 110 (1997) ("In both environmental protection and intellectual property, the very structure of the
decisionmaking process tends to produce a socially undesirable outcome."); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, at 33, 70-74 (comparing copyright activism to the environmental
movement); Symposium, CulturalEnvironmentalism at 10, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007
(collecting essays presented at a conference honoring Boyle's cultural environmentalism work).
53. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 43, at 1018-19 (cataloguing the advantages for
authors of a broad public domain).
54. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 29 (2004) ("Creators here and everywhere are
always and at all times building upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them
");NEIL
now.... No society, free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for ....
WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 135-36, on file
with author) (arguing that an expansive copyright law will tend to diminish the creation and
dissemination of additional works and lead to a clustering in already popular genres).
55. I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 657, 697
(1999) ("[T]he likelihood that authors given both a right and a market that permits them to demand
royalties in some profitable amount, would instead refuse royalties in any amount, seems small-far
less than the likelihood that they would happily receive them.").
56. See LESSIG, supra note 54, at 106 ("[T]he cost of complying with the law is impossibly
high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never made. And for that part
that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance rules, it doesn't get released."); Lydia Pallas Loren,
Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights,53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 698 (2003) ("[A]s a result
of the dual layers of copyrights and the divided rights granted to each owner, there are too many
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that personal use requires protection for the sake of authors. Rather, I want
to insist that copyright law encourages authorship at least as much for the
benefit of the people who will read, view, listen to, and experience the works
that authors create, as for the advantage of those authors and their
distributors.
For most of the history of copyright, the law left reading, listening, and
viewing unconstrained. 57 The copyright statutes on the books neither mentioned personal uses expressly, nor needed to. The exclusive rights granted
by copyright were narrow, and the law aimed its proscriptions at commercial
and institutional entities.58 Thus the opportunities of members of the public
to engage in unfettered reading, listening to, and looking at works protected
by copyright received little explicit attention. They nonetheless functioned
as historic copyright liberties,5 9 implicit in the copyright statutory scheme
and essential to its purpose. Copyright scholarship has tended to view these
liberties as lacunae in copyright owner control; this tendency may obscure
their affirmative importance in the copyright scheme.6 ° Courts, however,
have in many cases appreciated the role of copyright liberties and preserved
them against incursion, even where the language of the copyright statute offered no obvious route to protect them. Where copyright claims posed
serious threats to copyright liberties, courts often
responded by reading the
61
narrowly.
rights
exclusive
copyright's
of
scope

vested industry players for downstream users to be able to efficiently obtain the authorizations
needed for downstream use of recorded music."); Katie Dean, Copyright Reform to Free Orphans?,
WIRED, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,67139,00.html (discussing
problems with licensing "items still locked up under copyright but where the owners are unknown
or impossible to locate").
57. E.g., R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in Copyright Law 20 (Jan. 7, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Tushnet, supra note 25, 541-44.
58. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (2007)
(contrasting early U.S. copyright laws with the current statute).
59. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1397-1400 (1989)
(reimagining copyright law from the vantage point of user privilege).
60. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 43, at 967 ("This tendency can distort our
understanding of the interaction between copyright law and authorship. Specifically, it can lead us
to give short shrift to the public domain by failing to appreciate that the public domain is the law's
primary safeguard of the raw material that makes authorship possible.").
61. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) ("It may be
true... these perforated [piano] rolls ... enable[] the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the use of
musical compositions for which they pay no value.... As the act of Congress now stands we
believe it does not include these records as copies or publications of the copyrighted music .... ).
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Revisiting Older Cases

[T]he copyright statute accords the proprietor of a copyright a number
of exclusive rights. But unlike the patentee, the copyright owner does not
enjoy the exclusive right to 'use' his copyrighted work.
-Alan Latman, 195862
U.S. copyright law initially limited itself to securing the author's right
to "print, reprint, publish or vend. 63 In 1856, Congress added a public perde
formance right, limited to dramatic compositions. 64 In 1870, iitadded
65
dramatization and translation rights.
In 1897, it extended the public
performance right to musical compositions.6 6 The standard account of
nineteenth and early twentieth century copyright in the United States tells us
that Congress defined the scope of the copyright grant narrowly and courts
construed it stingily. 67 Looking back at early copyright law from the vantage
point of the twenty-first century, when copyright rights are broad, deep, and
very long,68 the scope of early copyright laws can seem startlingly
constrained. Focusing on the relative narrowness of early copyright's
excusive rights, though, can obscure the importance of the corresponding
breadth of individual liberties to read, view, listen, and use copyrightprotected works. When ambitious copyright-owner claims threatened to
encroach on copyright liberties, some courts resisted. The language of some
of the most notorious decisions limiting the scope of copyright advanced the
interests of readers, listeners, and viewers. Courts confronting novel claims
of infringement sought to locate the allegedly infringing behavior on the
continuum between exploitation and enjoyment, in order to preserve
copyright owners' control over exploitation while 69
denying them control over
individual reading, listening, playing, and viewing.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Latman, supra note 7, at 783.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481,481-82 (repealed 1909).

67. See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 326-27 (3d ed.

2000) (describing the "narrow view of copyright" applied by courts in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries); NETANEL, supra note 54 (manuscript at 46-47); Edward Samuels, The IdeaExpression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 325-47 (1989) (surveying the
development of copyright case law).
68. See Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act,
in which Congress extended the terms of existing and future copyrights).
69. The late Ray Patterson, in an important article published two decades ago, articulated this
distinction as the difference between using the copyright and using the work. See Patterson, supra
note 22, at 11 ("The distinction between the work and the copyright of the work is made clear by the
definition of copyright-a series of rights to which a given work is subject, for example, the right to
print, reprint, publish, and vend the work.").
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In Stowe v. Thomas,70 for example, Harriet Beecher Stowe sued to
enjoin the publication of an unauthorized German translation of Uncle Tom's
Cabin, and lost. 71 The court held that her copyright in the book did not extend so far:
An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both of the
ideas contained in his book, and the combination of words to represent
them. Before publication he has the exclusive possession of his
invention. His dominion is perfect. But when he has published his
book, and given his thoughts, sentiments, knowledge or discoveries to
the world, he can have no longer an exclusive possession of them.
Such an appropriation becomes impossible, and is inconsistent with
the object of publication. The author's conceptions have become the
common property of his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of
them, nor of their right to communicate them to another clothed in
their own language, by lecture or by treatise.7 2

Eaton Drone's 1879 copyright treatise described the decision in Stowe v.
Thomas as "clearly wrong, unjust and absurd," 73 and it has long been
traditional to cite the case as an example of the extraordinary stinginess of
nineteenth century U.S. copyright. 74 What we miss, though, when we look
only at how narrowly the court construed the author's rights, is its focus on
the rights of readers. The court struck a balance between the author's property interests and readers' "common property" interests, in which the
author's exclusive right yielded to her readers' right to communicate the
author's conception.7 5 The translator and publisher of the German edition
were, in this analysis, simply readers 76
of Stowe's book, exercising the
them.
afforded
law
copyright
liberties that

70. 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 206.
73. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY
PRODUCTIONS INGREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 455 n.4 (1879).

IN

INTELLECTUAL

74. See, e.g., Litman, Public Domain, supra note 43, at 980 (noting that Stowe's analysis
influenced courts in subsequent cases to interpret copyright law narrowly); Hannibal Travis, Pirates
of the Information Infrastructure:Blackstonian Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 777, 824 (2000) (characterizing Stowe as evidence of how far copyright protection has
progressed beyond the narrow prohibition extending only to literal copies); Naomi Abe Voegtli,
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1233 (1997) (citing Stowe as epitomizing
copyright law's narrow protection).
75. Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206.
76. See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880) ("The very object of publishing a book
on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains.
But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of
piracy of the book."); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes
from the Scope ofIts Protection, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1921, 1933 (2007) ("Baker was concerned not
just with freedoms for follow-on authors, but also with freedoms for readers and users of
copyrighted works, especially in the freedom to extract and employ the useful know-how from such
works ...").
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A century later, in a pair of copyright cases challenging cable television
systems' unlicensed transmission of broadcast signals, the Supreme Court
held that the cable operators were not performing the signals they transmitted
within the meaning of the statute, but should be deemed akin to viewers. 7
Similarly, when composers sued the owner of a small Pittsburgh restaurant
who entertained his customers by playing radio programs in the dining area,
the Court held that the restaurant owner could not be held liable for publicly
performing the music for profit.78 What restaurant owner George Aiken was
doing when he played the radio for his customers, the Court insisted, was not
performing, but listening. 79 The Court predicated its construction of the

77. In Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), a motion picture
studio that had licensed its programming to television for broadcast sued the operator of cable
television systems that had, without a license, transmitted the programming to customers in nearby
areas who had poor television reception because of the hilly terrain. The studio claimed that
Fortnightly was performing its motion pictures for profit. Id. at 400-01. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Id. at 393. The Court continued:
Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive
the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient
connection to the viewer's television set. It is true that a CATV system plays an
"active" role in making reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television
sets and antennas. CATV equipment is powerful and sophisticated, but the basic
function the equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment
generally furnished by a television viewer. If an individual erected an antenna on a
hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he
would not be "performing" the programs he received on his television set. The result
would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the
same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is
erected and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.
Id. at 399-400 (footnotes omitted). Six years later, the Court was invited to reexamine the line
between broadcaster and viewer in a copyright infringement case against a cable television company
that imported television broadcast signals from geographically remote areas. See Teleprompter
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974). The Court refused to find copyright liability. Id.
78. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
79. Id. at 162. The Court explained:
To hold in this case that the respondent Aiken "performed" the petitioners'
copyrighted works would.., result in a regime of copyright law that would be both
wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable.
The practical unenforceability of a ruling that all of those in Aiken's position are
copyright infringers is self-evident. One has only to consider the countless business
establishments in this country with radio or television sets on their premises-bars,
beauty shops, cafeterias, car washes, dentists' offices, and drive-ins-to realize the
total futility of any evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders to license even a
substantial percentage of them.
And a ruling that a radio listener "performs" every broadcast that he receives
would be highly inequitable for two distinct reasons. First, a person in Aiken's
position would have no sure way of protecting himself from liability for copyright
infringement except by keeping his radio set turned off. For even if he secured a
license from ASCAP, he would have no way of either foreseeing or controlling the
broadcast of compositions whose copyright was held by someone else. Secondly, to
hold that all in Aiken's position "performed" these musical compositions would be to
authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is basically a single public
rendition of a copyrighted work. The exaction of such multiple tribute would go far
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public performance right in part on its concern for the restaurant owner's
interest in listening to the radio.8 °
None of these cases targeted individual personal users directly; 8' all
were suits against intermediaries who facilitated reading, listening, and
viewing. 82 The courts resolved them in defendants' favor, though, by treating the intermediaries' activities as on the readers', listeners', or viewers'
side of the line between exploitation and enjoyment of copyrighted works.83
In other cases, courts explicitly addressed the intermediaries' role, but considered the potential effect on reader, listener, or viewer liberties of
prohibiting the use as an important and possibly determinative
consideration.84
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States85 has the distinction of having
been dubbed the "Dred Scott" case of copyright law. 86 Williams & Wilkins,
a publisher of thirty-seven medical journals, sued the National Library of
Medicine, claiming that photocopying journal articles to meet requests for

beyond what is required for the economic protection of copyright owners, and would
be wholly at odds with the balanced congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. § 1(e):
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to
music has been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his
composition, and it has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the
protection of the composer with the protection of the public, and to so frame an
act that it would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same time prevent
the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very
rights granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests.
Id. at 162-64 (footnotes omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 61-2222, at 7 (1909)).
80. Id.
81. Until the recent flood of peer-to-peer file sharing lawsuits, copyright infringement suits
against individuals were so rare as to be almost unthinkable. When Universal Studios included a
nominal claim against individual Betamax owner William Griffiths in its 1976 lawsuit against Sony,
that fact inspired a host of editorial cartoons, despite the fact that Mr. Griffiths was a client of the
firm representing Universal and had consented to be sued. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD
17-19 (2002).
82. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. 151 (restaurant owner defendant);
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390 (CATV system defendant); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (publisher defendant).
83. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 162-64 (comparing the restaurant
owner to a listener rather than a performer under the statute).
84. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) ("In no sense
can musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is
generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be understood in the statutes under
consideration."); Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206 ("The author's conceptions have become the common
property of his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor of their right to
communicate them to another clothed in their own language, by lecture or treatise.").
85. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af'd by an equally divided Court,420 U.S. 376 (1975).
86. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Williams & Wilkins Co., which has been appropriately regarded as the 'Dred Scott decision of
copyright law' is clearly not binding in this circuit, and, in any event, we find its underlying
rationale singularly unpersuasive." (citation omitted) (quoting Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at
1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting))), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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interlibrary loans infringed its copyrights.87 The Court of Claims held the
photocopying to be fair use. 88 The court began its analysis with the observation that the statutory right to "'copy' is not to be taken in its full literal
sweep. '89 The court continued:
The court-created doctrine of "fair use" . . . is alone enough to
demonstrate that Section 1 does not cover all copying (in the literal
sense). Some forms of copying, at the very least of portions of a
work, are universally deemed immune from liability, although the
very words are reproduced in more than de minimis quantity.
Furthermore, it is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can
make a handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own
90
use ....
Judge Davis's opinion relied on "years of accepted practice" of copying
entire poems, songs, illustrations, articles, and judicial opinions for personal
use to support the proposition that copyright law permits unlicensed copying
in a host of situations, 9' and then focused on the burden to individual medical
researchers of deeming the Library's copying to be infringing:
If photocopying were forbidden, the researchers, instead of
subscribing to more journals or trying to obtain or buy back-issues or
reprints (usually unavailable), might expend extra time in note-taking
or waiting their turn for the library's copies of the original issues-or
they might very well cut down their reading and do without much of
the information they now get through NLM's and NIH's copying
system. The record shows that each of the individual requesters in this
case already subscribed, personally, to a number of medical journals,
and it is very questionable how many more, if any, they would add.
The great problems with reprints and back-issues have already been
noted. In the absence of photocopying, the financial, time-wasting,
and other difficulties of obtaining the material could well lead, if
human experience is a guide, to a simple but drastic reduction in the
use of the many articles (now sought and read) which are not
absolutely crucial to the individual's work but are merely stimulating
or helpful. The probable effect on scientific progress goes without
saying. 92
In the aggregate, the Library's photocopying was massive. 93 The court
nonetheless concluded it was noninfringing because of the personal use

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1346-48.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1348.
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interests of94each of the many individual researchers for whom the copies

were made.

In Sony v. Universal Studios, copyright owners sued the producer of the
videocassette recorder, claiming that it should be liable for the massive
copyright infringement of the millions of consumers who used its VCR to
record broadcast programming off the air.95 The Supreme Court held that
recording a program to enable its later viewing, while technically an unauthorized copy, was fair use and therefore not actionable 96: "One may search
the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the
millions of people who watch television every day have made it unlawful to
copy a program for later viewing at home ....
Other opinions famous for their stingy constructions of copyright
owners' control also advanced the interests of readers, listeners, and viewers.
White-Smith v. Apollo, for example, stands in the copyright lexicon for the
illogical narrowness of the copyright law of its era. 98 In White-Smith, a music publisher sued to enjoin the manufacture of piano rolls designed to cause
player pianos to play songs protected by the publisher's copyright. 99 The
Court held that piano rolls were not "copies" within the meaning of the
statute, and they therefore did not infringe:
When the combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is
the original tune as conceived by the author which is heard. These
musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye. In no sense can
musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to
be copies, as that term is generally understood. ...
"100

94. Id. at 1362.
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
96. Id. at 454-55; see also Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary
Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIEs 358 (Jane C. Ginsburg
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005) [hereinafter Litman, Story of Sony] (describing internal
Supreme Court memoranda that document the Court's deliberations in Sony).
97. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. The interests of television viewers had more influence on the result
in Sony than the ultimate opinion reveals. Justice Stevens, who authored the majority opinion,
focused primarily on the rights of homeowners using VCRs from the first Supreme Court
deliberations on the case. Indeed, an early draft of Justice Stevens's opinion characterized the
lawsuit as an effort "to control the way William Griffiths watches television." Litman, Story of
Sony, supra note 96, at 358.
98. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 75 (6th ed. 2003) (asking whether the
White-Smith analysis is "at least defensible"); Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts,
Media Neutrality, and New Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 428 (2005) (characterizing
the White-Smith judgment as "formalistic"). For a different analysis that seeks to rehabilitate the
White-Smith opinion, see Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original
Parameters of Exclusive Reproduction, I1 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 215, 230 (2006) (arguing that the
Court in White-Smith construed "copying" as "substitution-the functional equivalent of 'printing'
for books" (footnote omitted)).
99. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1908).
100. Id. at 17. The Court reasoned:
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a tune
copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning. When the combination of
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The effect of White-Smith was to allow nonmusicians who would otherwise
have been unable to play the copyrighted songs to enjoy listening to them in
their homes.' 01
Looked at from the vantage point of a copyright owner seeking
enforcement of its rights, these opinions have seemed unreasonably
conservative and have been criticized accordingly. 0 2 Viewed from the perspective of readers, listeners, and viewers, though, the decisions vindicate
their continuing importance in the copyright formula. Stowe v. Thomas recognized the rights of Stowe's readers; White-Smith v. Apollo and Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken advanced the interests of listeners; Sony and
the cable television cases upheld the rights of viewers. Williams & Wilkins
suggested that copyright law has always excused strictly personal copying.
If copyright law is designed to encourage reading, viewing, listening, and
experiencing works of authorship as well as creating and distributing them,
then courts' reluctance to read the copyright grant too expansively can be
seen as an effort to preserve that equilibrium. Cases that are conventionally
painted as the most notorious examples of courts' crabbed construction of
copyright may be more usefully understood as defenses of the central place
of readers, listeners, and players in the copyright scheme. Copyright rights
cannot promote the Progress of Science unless readers, listeners, and viewers
have the liberties necessary to enjoy copyrighted works. Where expansive
constructions of statutory rights would have meaningfully constricted historic
copyright liberties, these courts refused to interpret the rights so broadly.
More recently, a handful of courts have given copyright rights a
similarly constrained reading in cases involving computer technology. In
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,10 3 Nintendo sued the
maker of the Game Genie, which allowed consumers to modify the way a

musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the
author which is heard. These musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye. In
no sense can musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be
copies, as that term is generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be
understood in the statutes under consideration.
A musical composition is an
intellectual creation which first exists in the mind of the composer; he may play it for
the first time upon an instrument. It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been
put in a form which others can see and read. The statute has not provided for the
protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced, however
meritorious such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing of a
tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of the
statute to protect the composer.
Id.; see also Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (D.C. Cir. 1901) (holding that phonograph records
are not "copies").
101. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17-18.
102. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Copyright and Control,supra note 14, at 210, 206-10 ("[C]ourts faced
with what appeared to be all-or-nothing attempts at copyright enforcement, preferred to interpret the
statute in a way that would leave the copyright owners with nothing.").
103. 780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).

HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1889 2006-2007

1890

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 85:1871

Nintendo game played. 0 4 Nintendo argued that the Game Genie caused
consumers to create unauthorized derivative works by varying the Nintendo
games' audiovisual display. 0 5 The trial court noted: "The alleged infringer
in this case is not a commercial licensee, but rather a consumer utilizing the
Game Genie for noncommercial, private enjoyment. Such use neither generates a fixed transferable copy of the work, nor exhibits or performs the work
for commercial gain., 10 6 The consumer, the court concluded, did not infringe
Nintendo's copyright by using a Game Genie to alter the game play of
Nintendo games:
Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the copyright laws, for
a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how to
modify the rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game. Once
having purchased, for example, a copyrighted board game, a consumer
is free to take the board home and modify the game in any way the
consumer chooses, whether or not the method used comports with the
copyright holder's intent. The copyright holder, having received
expected value, has no further control over the consumer's private
enjoyment of that game.
Because of the technology involved, owners of video games are less
able to experiment with or change the method of play, absent an
electronic accessory such as the Game Genie. This should not mean
that holders of copyrighted video games are entitled to broader
protections or monopoly rights than holders of other types of
copyrighted games, simply because a more sophisticated technology is
involved. Having paid Nintendo a fair return, the consumer may
experiment with the product and create new variations
of play, for
10 7
personal enjoyment, without creating a derivative work.
It followed that Galoob did not infringe by selling the device that
enabled the consumers' use. 108 The court of appeals affirmed. 109 Neither the
trial court nor the court of appeals was able to ground its interpretation in the
literal language of § 106(2) of the copyright statute; instead, each court gave
the language a narrowing gloss because each was persuaded of the importance of the consumers' interest in playing games they had purchased. That

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1286.
106. Id. at 1291.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1292.
109. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992); see
also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing a
contributory infringement claim for the distribution of software that allowed consumers to make
infringing copies of a computer program on the ground that the software also facilitated consumers'
unauthorized but noninfringing backup copies and was therefore capable of substantial
noninfringing use).
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interest, the courts concluded, extended to adapting 10
the games to enable them
to play them in ways that they wanted to play them.'
In Lotus Development Corp. v. BorlandInternationalInc.,"' Lotus
sued Borland for copying the words and arrangement of the menu command
hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program, which Lotus insisted embodied the program's "look and feel." ' 1 2 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit concluded that whether or not the menu command hierarchy resulted
from expressive choices, it was uncopyrightable as a "method of operation"
under § 102(b) of the copyright statute.' 1 3 Judge Boudin, concurring,
expressed some discomfort with the majority's rationale. In his view, the
interests of Lotus's customers, who had invested time learning Lotus's commands and devising their own macros, required a judgment for Borland. The
difficulty was finding an appropriate rationale to support it:
If Lotus is granted a monopoly on this pattern, users who have
learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own
macros are locked into Lotus, just as a typist who has learned the
QWERTY keyboard would be the captive of anyone who had a
monopoly on the production of such a keyboard. Apparently, for a
period Lotus 1-2-3 has had such sway in the market that it has
represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet
commands. So long as Lotus is the superior spreadsheet-either in
quality or in price-there may be nothing wrong with this advantage.
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why
customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning
made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus has already reaped a
substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland program
is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus
customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new
advance, and to reward Borland in turn for making a better product. If
Borland has not made a better product, then customers will remain
with Lotus anyway.

110. See Lewis Galoob Toys, 780 F. Supp. at 1291. The trial court observed:
The Game Genie is a tool by which the consumer may temporarily modify the way in
which to play a video game, legally obtained at market price. Any modification is for
the consumer's own enjoyment in the privacy of the home. Such a process is
analogous in purpose, if not in technology, to skipping portions of a book, learning to
speed read, fast-forwarding a video tape one has purchased in order to skip portions
one chooses not to see, or using slow motion for the opposite reasons.
Id.
111. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
112. Id. at 810.
113. Id. at 816; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
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Thus, for me the question is not whether Borland should prevail but
on what basis. 114
In Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc.,' 1 5 the recording industry brought suit to enjoin the sale of the
first portable MP3 player under the Audio Home Recording Act.' 16 The
recording industry argued that, in return for shielding consumers from
liability for noncommercial copying of recorded music, the law required
digital audio recording devices to incorporate copy-protection technology
and pay copyright royalties to compensate rights holders for the presumed
copies made by individuals.' 17 Since Diamond neither paid the statutory
royalties nor included serial copy management technology in the device's
design, the RIAA argued, its manufacture and sale of the device was
illegal. 118 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that portable
MP3 players were not subject to the copy-protection and royalty payment
requirements of the Audio Home Recording Act." 9 Moreover, the court
continued: "The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or
'space-shift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard drive.... Such
copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with
the purposes of the Act."'' 20 The court's language reflects a conviction that
noncommercial personal use was lawful, and marketing devices that
facilitated it, therefore, could not engender liability.
The line of authority reading copyright rights narrowly to preserve the
liberties of readers, listeners, or viewers is by no means undisputed. For
every case in which a copyright defendant persuaded a court to read statutory
exclusive rights narrowly, there is at least one in which the court mechanically applied the literal language of the statute to find infringement without
2
much attention to the effects of the ruling on readers, listeners, or viewers.' '
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 22 for example, defendant sought to
rely on Sony and Recording Industry Ass 'n of America to argue that users of

114.
115.
116.
117.

Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1075.

118. Id.

119. Id.at 1081.
120. Id.at 1079.
121. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that transitory random access memory reproduction of the copyrighted software was
sufficiently "fixed," under the statutory definition, to infringe the right to reproduce a work in
copies); Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that playing a coin-operated videogame in a video arcade is an infringing public
performance); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351, 354-55
(N.D. Tex. 1986) (concluding that children who played tapes containing public domain material in
Teddy Ruxpin toys created infringing audiovisual works that were substantially similar to the
copyrighted audiovisual work comprising a Teddy Ruxpin tape playing in a Teddy Ruxpin toy).
122. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1892 2006-2007

2007]

Lawful Personal Use

1893

its software engaged in lawful personal copying. 23 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found that argument too hard to swallow. Judge Beezer's
opinion rejected Napster's argument that downloading music from other individuals might be excused either by the Audio Home Recording Act or by
the fair use doctrine. 124 Indeed, appalled by the vast scale, in the aggregate,
of millions of individuals' copying music from each other's hard drives,
Judge Beezer declared the consumer copying to be commercial. 25 In
Grokster, the Supreme Court predicated its opinion on the assumptionuncontested by defendants-that the vast majority of consumer file sharing
over peer-to-peer networks was blatantly illegal. 126 Not all courts consider
the impact of their rulings on personal uses, and not all personal uses strike
courts as legitimate. The strongest inference the case law supports is that
reader, listener, and viewer interests have influenced many courts' reading of
the scope of copyright, and that influence dates back to the earliest copyright
cases.
At least some courts, then, have long treated reading, listening, viewing,
and using as essential copyright liberties. When copyright owners' claims
have trod on them too heavily, courts have read copyright's exclusive rights
narrowly to preserve those liberties from copyright-owner control. Reading,
listening, viewing, and their modem cousins watching, playing, running, and
building, are central to the copyright scheme. We knew that once, but forgot
it sometime within the past generation as the rhetoric of copyright increasingly characterized personal uses as piracy and theft. If we think about
personal use as a guilty pleasure that is probably morally wrong, we're going
to lose it. If we recall that encouraging personal use is an objective that's
crucial to the copyright system, we may find the will to defend it against increasingly forceful encroachment.
III. What Is "Personal Use?"
It would plainly be unconstitutional to prohibit a person from singing a
copyrighted song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted poem he hears
on the radio.
-Justice John Paul Stevens, 1983127
In order to sidestep extant debates about what counts as "private use,"
"noncommercial use," or "use by a consumer," in which advocates for

123. Id. at 1019.
124. Id. at 1019, 1024.
125. Id. at 1015 ("Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use.
Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered
for sale, may constitute a commercial use.").
126. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005).
127. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Justices of the 1983 U.S. Supreme
Court at 18 (June 1983) (on file with author); see Litman, Sony Paradox,supra note 38, at 930-34
(discussing Justice Stevens' first draft of his opinion in Sony).
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various results have taken hardened positions,128 I'd like to avoid previously
contested vocabulary. I want to start with a definition of "personal use." I
offer the definition on the assumption that some subset of personal use will
be lawful, some subset will be infringing, and that the legality of some personal uses will be controversial. With that disclaimer, I propose to define
"personal use" as a use that an individual makes for herself, her family, or
her close friends. 29 So defined, personal use can take place at home or at
work, on the street or in the store. It may happen with or without a commercial purpose. It may or may not compete with copyright owners' planned
exploitation of their works. It may occur within a statutory exemption. It
may be either permitted or prohibited by a license. Figuring out which personal uses are lawful and which are not will give us a chance to examine the
place of personal use in the copyright scheme.
In the spirit of rhetorical experiment, and as part of my strategy for
sidestepping existing controversies, I propose to refer to the individuals who
130
make personal
use as "persons,"
"people,"'
or "individuals" rather than
'' 133
' ' 13 1
13 2
"consumers,

"users,"

or "fans.

128. See Music on the Internet: Is There an Up Side to Downloading?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfn?
id=195 (expressing divergent views); Lutheran-Hymnal.com, Permissions and Copyright,
http://www.lutheran-hymnal.com/about-us/permisionandcopyright.html ("Personal private use is
not permission for archiving this material for your self [sic] or others in any manner .. ");
MusicUnited.org, The Law, http://www.musicunited.org/2_thelaw.html ("If you make unauthorized
copies of copyrighted music recordings, you're stealing."); University of Georgia, Regents Guide to
Understanding Copyright & Educational Fair Use - Office of Legal Affairs, http://www.usg.edu/
legallcopyright/#part3d3b ("[S]ince personal fair use is a use of the work-not the copyright-it is
always a protected use.").
129. For a somewhat broader definition, see Tussey, supra note 28, at 1134 (. Personal use,' in
the broad sense, means consumption or adaptation of intellectual properties by individual users for
their own purposes, including uncompensated sharing of those works with others."). For a narrower
definition, see Lutheran-Hymnal.com, supra note 128 ("Personal private use is that which occurs
within you [sic] immediate biological family....").
130. See Stadler, supra note 58, at 914 (referring to consumers of copyrighted material as
"people").
131. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 29, at 400 ("I am consciously choosing the term 'consumer,'
rather than a more neutral term like 'user,' 'the public,' or 'audience,' in part because I wish to
focus on those uses that are literally consumptive rather than productive in nature, and the term
roughly captures this distinction.").
132. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30, at 347 ("Most... have settled... on 'users,' a term that
manages simultaneously to connote both more active involvement.., and a residual aura of
addiction .... ").
133. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, LAW.COM, Sept. 29,
2004, http://www.law.comjsp/article.jsp?id= 1095434496352 (referring to users of peer-to-peer filesharing software as "music fans"); see also Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and
Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEXAS L. REv. 923 (1999) (critiquing scholarly assertions of
nonowner interests in intellectual property).
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IV. What Personal Uses Are Lawful?
Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for purpose of private study
and review.
-Saul Cohen, 1955134
With a definition of personal use to work with, we can start to map out
which personal uses are lawful and which infringe. A standard paradigm for
construing the copyright law holds that any unlicensed use that falls within
the literal terms of § 106, which gives copyright owners control over fixed
reproductions, adaptations, and public distributions, performances, and
displays, 35 violates the copyright law unless it comes within the terms of an
express statutory exemption.136 As I will explore in detail below, I believe
that rubric is at best misleading, but it will give us a place to begin. Even if
the standard paradigm accurately describes the law, there is a large class of
personal uses that are simply outside of the scope of the current copyright
statute. That zone, smaller than it used to be, includes all private performances and displays.137 It includes all private distributions, since the copyright
owner's distribution right is limited to distributions "to the public."' 38 Copyright owners have no copyright rights that would allow them to control
private performances, displays, or distributions. Nor have copyright owners
any right to prohibit
people from making unfixed reproductions of copy39
righted works. 1

134. Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 58
(1955).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
136. See, e.g., MusicUnited.org, supra note 128 ("[Y]ou need the permission of the copyright
holder before you copy and/or distribute a copyrighted music recording."); Brad Templeton, 10 Big
Myths About Copyright Explained, http://www.templetons.com/bradcopymyths.html ("[C]opyright
law makes it technically illegal to reproduce almost any new creative work .... ").
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5). The copyright statute's definitions of "display" and "perform" are
broad enough to encompass looking at and listening to:
To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film,
slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially....
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.
17 U.S.C. § 101. Because the statutory performance and display rights are limited to public
performance and public display, they do not encompass watching television in the living room,
listening to music in the bedroom, or looking at the poster that is hanging on the wall of the kitchen.
See H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62-65 (1976).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) ("[T]o distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental lease or lending .... "). This limitation has
attracted almost no attention in the thirty years since the enactment of the 1976 Act, presumably
because few unauthorized private distributions of copies or phonorecords have attracted litigation.
139. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,106(1).
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A number of other personal uses are permitted because of statutory
The first sale doctrine in § 109 allows
exemptions and privileges.
distribution and display to the public of owned, lawfully made copies and
phonorecords. 140 Section 109(e) permits the public performance of video
games on coin-operated machines.14 1 Section 110(5) allows people to listen
to and watch radio and television broadcasts in public places, so long as they
use the sort of equipment commonly found in private homes. 42 Section
110(11) allows private households to use software to hide objectionable
scenes in motion pictures they are viewing.143 Section 117 permits people to
modify and make backup copies of the computer programs on their
computers. 144 Section 120 allows homeowners to renovate and photograph
their homes, notwithstanding the architects' reproduction and adaptation
rights.' 45 Section 602 permits people to import copies or phonorecords of
copyrighted works for use (as distinguished from sale) as part of their personal luggage.'46 Section 1008 prohibits copyright infringement suits against
consumers who make noncommercial copies of recorded music (at least so
long as they use analog or digital audio recording devices or media). 4 7
In addition, the statute includes specific exemptions for intermediaries
to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or display works for the benefit of
people who are making exempt personal uses. Section 110(11) allows software companies to create and market programs designed to assist individuals
who wish to censor offensive scenes in motion picture broadcasts or
DVDs. 148 Section 111 allows the proprietors of hotels and apartment buildings to transmit broadcast programs to individual apartments and hotel rooms
so that the occupants can perform them privately. 49 Section 117 permits
computer repair services authorized by people who own computers to run the
copyrighted computer programs installed on individuals' machines as part of
the repair process.15° Section 121 allows nonprofit groups to reproduce

140. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 109(e).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
143. Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201-02, 119 Stat. 223, 223-24 (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 120.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 1008. The scope of the § 1008 prohibition against infringement suits is
contested. See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, 81 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1407
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that § 1008 protects XM radio from suit based on actions taken in its
capacity as a distributor of audio recording devices, but not from suit based on its conduct as a
satellite radio broadcaster, or from suit based on its actions as an "XM + Mp3" content delivery
provider); Litman, War Stories, supra note 6, at 357-60, 359 n. 114 (discussing § 1008 and its
scope).
148. See Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201-02, 119 Stat. 223, 223-24 (to
be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)).
149. 17U.S.C.§ 111.

150. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c).
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copyrighted books and magazines in a format that allows blind and disabled
people to read or listen to them.' 5 '
Finally, some personal uses that qualify for no express statutory
exemption have been held to be privileged by courts. Sony v. Universal
Studios classified home video recording of broadcast television signals for
time shifting purposes as fair use, and the manufacture and sale of devices to
accomplish it as noninfringing.'1 2 Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems held that the consumer copying of digital mu53
sic recordings to a portable MP3 player was noninfringing personal use,'
and that the
manufacture and sale of devices to facilitate it was not
54
actionable.
Before moving into more controversial territory, let's pause for
reflection. All of us make personal uses of copyrighted works that don't
seem to fall within any of the exclusions I outlined above. 155 I back up my
hard disk every week, even though I know that I am making archival copies
of material that is not a computer program and therefore is not within the
scope of the privilege in § 117.156 Indeed, chastened by the repeated
meltdown of a shiny new iMac G5 two years ago, I back it up to three

151. 17 U.S.C. § 121.
152. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984).
153. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 1999). The court's basis for this conclusion is ambiguous. It isn't clear whether the court
intended to hold that such copying came within the shelter of 17 U.S.C. § 1008 or was excused on
some other ground, such as fair use. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001). In a recent Copyright Office filing, a coalition of copyright owners insisted that such
copying was lawful only to the extent that copyright owners had implicitly authorized it. See Joint
Reply Comments of Ass'n of American Publishers et al. at 21-23, 22 n.46, Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies,
No. RM 2005-11 (U.S. Copyright Office Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2006/reply/l metalitz_AAP.pdf.
154. Recording Indus. Ass'n ofAm., 180 F.3d at 1081.
155. See Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Most honest citizens in the
modem world frequently engage, without hesitation, in trivial copying that, but for the de minimis
doctrine, would technically constitute a violation of law.").
156. According to the Register of Copyrights, the literal scope of the § 117 privilege to make
archival or backup copies is very narrow; so narrow, indeed, that compliance makes little sense:
Section 117 requires the destruction of any archived copy once possession of the
program ceases to be rightful. Possession-or at least use--of a program typically
ceases to be rightful once the user acquires an upgraded version. A literal reading of
section 117 would require the user to go through all of the backup tapes, CD-Rs and
other archival media, identify each of the files that constitute the earlier version of the
computer program, and attempt to delete them. This is neither practical nor reasonable.
Based on the evidence presented during the course of preparing this Report, there
is a fundamental mismatch between accepted, prudent practice among most system
administrators and other users, on one hand, and section 117 on the other. As a
consequence, few adhere to the letter of the law.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA § 104 REPORT: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS

PURSUANT TO § 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 150 (2001) [hereinafter
DMCA § 104 REPORT] (footnote omitted), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/
dmca/sec- 104-report-vol- .pdf.
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different locations. My son collects comic books and manga, and practices
drawing manga characters that look as much as possible like the drawings he
uses as models. My husband has purchased two computer programs that allow him to record, scan, manipulate, transpose, revise, and generate sheet
music or audio files for musical compositions. He uses them on songs from
Broadway musicals to create versions easy for our son to sing. My sister's
family has a TiVo. They like it so much that they bought one as a birthday
present for our mother. My friend Ann cannot be discouraged from forwarding me email messages that she thinks I'll enjoy. My neighbor across
the street has triplets to whom she frequently reads aloud. Because of her
firm ideas about what's appropriate literature for her children, she commonly
edits language, gender, and important plot points as she reads, on the fly. My
neighbors down the block are college students who party loudly on summer
weekends, playing their CDs through powerful speakers; if they open their
windows, their sound of music reaches the entire neighborhood.
The conventional analysis would tell us that when those uses involve a
fixed reproduction, an adaptation, or a public distribution, performance, or
display, then they infringe copyright unless they are excused by the fair use
privilege codified in § 107. My hard disk backups, my son's drawings, my
mother's TiVo, and my friend's email messages all involve unauthorized
fixed reproduction. My neighbor's reading aloud generates unauthorized
adaptations. My husband's software permits him to do both. My neighbors
down the block are engaged in unauthorized public performance. If the conventional analysis is right, then either our uses are fair under the multifactor
statutory test, or we are routinely breaking the law.
The tools we have developed to evaluate a claim of fair use, though,
seem ill-fitted to assess the lawfulness of these or other common personal
uses. 57 The statute, as interpreted by the courts, would have us ask whether
the purpose of use is commercial or noncommercial, whether it is transformative or duplicative, whether the work we are using is primarily factual or
occupies the core of protected copyrightable expression, whether we use only
a small part of the work or a large part, or even the entire thing, and whether
our uses threaten to substitute for authorized, licensed uses in the
marketplace.15 8 Whether the use is commercial seems as if it might be
important, as does whether it usurps the market for or competes with the

157. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 25, at 554 ("Commentators have noted a tendency to claim
as fair use activities like private reading or listening ....
But fair use.., is ill suited to protecting
activities that are at the core of ordinary uses of copyrighted works; it is supposed to deal with
unusual or marginal activities.").
158. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79
(1994) (applying the fair use factors to a musical parody); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
37 F.3d 881, 886-99 (2d Cir. 1994) (analyzing institutional copying of legally acquired scholarly
journals under fair use). But see id at 932, 933-34 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (arguing that
photocopying should be deemed the modem equivalent of taking notes).
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copyright owner's exploitation. 159 The other fair use factors, though, don't
seem apposite. 160 Two of the weightiest considerations in a conventional fair
use analysis are whether the use is transformative' 16 and how much of the
work is being used. 162 Neither seems to illuminate whether a given personal
use should be lawful. 163 Nor is the nature of the work being used likely to
make a big difference. We care about the nature of a work when we are
asking whether it makes sense to allow someone to make the work available
to the public in either transformed or unchanged form. Where the use is
personal, though, it's hard to see how the nature of the work would matter. If
copyright law is designed to encourage the creation and dissemination of
works of that nature, it should also welcome their consumption.
Thus, if we analyze my multiple backups of my hard disk, it's difficult
to conclude that I am making a fair use unless we put a thumb on the scales.
The purpose of the use is duplicative and archival, something that cut against
164
a finding of fair use in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.
Moreover, many of the files on my hard drive are files I use for projects, like
my trademarks casebook, 165 that I pursue primarily for commercial gain. The
nature of the works that I copy is mixed, but at least some of the works are of
the sort that courts locate at the core of copyright protection. I have, for
example, more than fourteen gigabytes of music on my hard drive. All of it
got there legitimately in the first instance, but that doesn't give me the right
to make three different copies of entire songs every week, nor to transmit one
of those copies over the Internet to a remote location. Some of the files on
my hard disk, such as early drafts of student papers and other people's

159. See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 58, at 933-42 (reconceptualizing copyright law to protect
authors from competitive harms).
160. Indeed, it's interesting that Sony, the sole Supreme Court case to try to assess personal use
under the fair use rubric, was widely criticized for its analysis of the fair use factors. The case
attracted particular scorn for giving only nominal consideration to factors other than whether the use
was commercial and whether it was likely to harm the copyright owner's market. See, e.g., Jessica
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 897-98
(1987) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright] (explaining how this analysis would "truncate[] the statutory
inquiry"); Litman, Technological Change, supra note 20, at 350 n.411 (criticizing the Sony Court's
approach); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1137, 1153 (1990) ("Most of the commentary about the Sony opinion has been critical, even
dismissive.").
161. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 ("Although ... transformative use is not absolutely
necessary for a finding of fair use ... the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright .... ).
162. See id. at 587, 586-89 ("[Tlhis factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the
materials used, but about their quality and importance, too.").
163. Accord Tushnet, supra note 25, at 555-60 (arguing that increasing emphasis on the
transformativeness of a use has made fair use unavailable for copying that should be lawful).
164. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
165. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. forthcoming 2007).
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scholarship, further, are unpublished works. 166 Other files represent copies
that infringe other people's copyrights. The amount of these works that I
copy is entire works, and I copy them, in their entirety, many times. Finally,
we come to the effect of my promiscuous copying on the copyright owner's
potential market. There is currently no market for licensing backup copies.
Copyright owners' release of copy-protected copies of their works that permit purchasers to make a small number of copies, however, suggests that
such a market may be beginning to emerge. 167 If I, and people like me, may
make multiple archival
copies without a license, then that nascent market
168
could be damaged.
Less fancifully, consider my sister's TiVo. Let's imagine that she sets it
to copy every first-run episode of ABC's hit series Lost, which airs in her
community at a time when she is otherwise occupied. The purpose of her
copying is duplicative rather than transformative. She's motivated solely by
considerations of convenience. The nature of the work is highly creative and
subject to copyright's strongest protection. She's copying entire programs,
and her copies allow her to avoid paying $1.99 per episode for downloadable
69
copies through the friendly neighborhood Apple iTunes online music store.'
That last fact has been enough in some cases to persuade a court to characterize a use as commercial, since one is getting for free something one would
otherwise have to pay for. 7 °
My sister doesn't do a lot of business travel, but my mother does. Let's
imagine that, next year, one of mom's tech-savvy children buys her a
Slingbox to hook up to that TiVo she got from my sister. A Slingbox is a
small and clever electronic device that connects to the source of one's television signal and to one's home network. 17 The Slingbox will then allow one

166. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (holding
that the unpublished nature of a work tends to negate the fair use defense).
167. See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughtsonmusic/ (describing Apple iTunes "FairPlay" DRM, which allows songs to be copied to
up to five computers).
168. Cf Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding copying of
scientific articles for a company's researchers unfair in part because it might undermine the nascent
market for photocopy licenses); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding a display of thumbnail images in an image search engine unfair because it might undermine
the nascent market for downloadable thumbnail images of pornography to display on cell phone
screens).
169. See Apple - iTunes - iTunes Store - TV Shows, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/
tvshows.html (offering episodes of Lost for $1.99 per episode).
170. See, e.g., Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16165 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (holding that a music file search engine and the people
who used it made commercial use of copyrighted works because they didn't pay the customary
price); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Moreover, the fact that Napster users get for
free something they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from
Napster use.").
171. Sling Media, Slingbox Tuner, http://us.slingmedia.com/page/slingboxtuner.html.
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to "place shift" one's television signal. 172 That is, the Slingbox-equipped are
able to watch whatever is currently playing on their home televisions on remote computers over the Internet.173 My mother isn't much for Lost, but she
likes to watch games being played by her local Pittsburgh sports teams, and
she likes to watch them live. She subscribes to whatever tier of cable service
allows her to see all of the Pittsburgh sporting events. Last winter, she came
to visit us in Michigan. As delightful as she found our company, she was
upset to be missing a University of Pittsburgh basketball game that was going on at the time but not being broadcast nationally. If she had just stayed
home, she could have watched the game. If she had had a Slingbox, though,
she could have visited us and watched the game. Any of her children could
buy one at the local Circuit City and hook it up for her, but would using it be
legal? The Slingbox makes no copies, unless you count RAM copies
(reproductions that appear only in a device's volatile computer memory), but
many courts do. 17 4 It also is transmitting a television signal over the Internet,
in what may not be a private (and therefore exempt) performance. If we have
to apply the fair use factors to allow my mother to view material she has subscribed to and paid for in my home rather than her own, her chances don't
look too good. Mom's purpose is consumptive rather than transformative.
The material she's copying and transmitting, at least in this instance, is a
televised sporting event. While sportscasts don't reflect the sort of authorship that we think of as at the core of copyright, they are among the most
valuable broadcasts that copyright protects. She's copying and transmitting
entire programs, and her doing so undercuts the market for online
and mobile
1 75
phone products that copyright owners target to viewers like her.
We could rerun the four-factor fair use analysis on all of the personal
uses I described earlier. The conclusion that would emerge from the analysis
is that some personal uses are and should be legal, others aren't and
shouldn't be, and the rest occupy a murky middle ground. The statutory fair
use test, though, is remarkably unhelpful in identifying which uses are, or
should be, legal.
The inaptness of the fair use factors shouldn't surprise us. They derive
from an era when copyright covered only the rights to print, reprint, publish,

172. Mark Glaser, Slingbox Lets You Place-Shift Your TV, PBS.ORG, May 1, 2006,
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2006/05/coolfactorslingboxletsyou-b.html.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The
law also supports the conclusion that Peak's loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a
'copy' of that software in violation of the Copyright Act."). For a discussion of why reproductions
in RAM should not be deemed "copies" under the copyright statute, see Joseph P. Liu, Owning
Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1245, 1255-78 (2001) and Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134.
175. See Wireless - CBS SportsLine.com, http://www.sportsline.com/wireless/generalmobile
(offering live coverage of sporting events); Fox Sports on MSN, http://msn.foxsports.com (same).
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and vend, and most personal uses required no excuse to be lawful. 176 When
seeking language in which to codify the fair use privilege, the drafters of the
1976 Copyright Act looked back to Folsom v. Marsh, 77 an 1841 case involving commercial publication of an allegedly infringing biography. 78 Litigated
cases involving fair use over the next century involved uses that were public
and almost always commercial. 179 The application of the fair use privilege to
personal use received almost no attention during the twenty-five year process
that led to the enactment of the 1976 Act.180 When the topic came up,
witnesses invariably pointed out that reported fair use decisions involved
public, commercial uses.' 8 1 Although witnesses disagreed then, as they undoubtedly would now, as to whether the paucity of judicial decisions on the
lawfulness of personal use derived from the legitimacy of the uses or the litigation costs that might make suits against individuals unappetizing, i1 2 it
seems clear that fair use cases, then as now, have overwhelmingly concerned
uses that were public, commercial, or both. For that reason, the fair use factors are designed to address whether and when it is appropriate to make a
public and often commercial use without permission. They were not devised
to evaluate the legitimacy of personal uses.
Fair use is a poor tool for assessing the lawfulness of particular personal
uses for another reason: it is not realistically available to the people who
most need to use it. Fair use in its current form is notoriously fact specific,

176. See Lunney, supra note 29, at 997-98 ("At that time, the printing press was essentially the
only technology available for reproducing a copyrighted work, and given that technology, the
question of infringement arose.., when a second, competing printer published a later work that
incorporated, to a greater or lesser extent, material from an earlier copyrighted work."); R. Anthony
Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: DistinguishingBetween Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259, 280, 286-88 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006) ("Justice Story never mentions the specific rights actually conferred on the
plaintiffs by the copyright statute, but the 1931 Act provided that the copyright owner of a book
'shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such book."').
177. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
178. Reese, supra note 176, at 292.
179. See Latman, supra note 7, at 789-90 (describing the case law).
180. See Litman, Technological Change, supra note 20, at 313-14 ("The fact that private use
had no defenders and received no explicit treatment in the revision conferences, therefore, had
substantive results on the legality of private use under the revision bill.").
181. Litman, Copyright, supra note 160, at 898 n.256, 883-88, 897-98 ("Indeed, prior to the
1976 Act, almost all fair use case law involved commercial uses. This fact figured significantly in
the controversy between copyright owners and educational organizations over the appropriate scope
of fair use in educational contexts.").
182. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1498-99 (1965) (statement of Ralph H. Dwan, on behalf of 3M Company)
("Since no legal action has ever been brought against anyone for [copying works for personal use],
the public has a right to believe that the practice is perfectly lawful, and copyright owners have
acquiesced in that right."); id. at 1514-16 (statement of Lyle Lodwick, Director of Marketing,
Williams & Wilkins Company) (suggesting that millions of individuals who make photocopies are
innocent infringers, and Congress should expand infringement liability to the owners and operators
of photocopy machines to give publishers a meaningful remedy against this widespread
infringement).

HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1902 2006-2007

2007]

Lawful Personal Use

1903

requiring a hideously expensive trial on the merits to determine. 83 If a person seeking to determine whether a given personal use is lawful needs to go
to court, each time, to find out, then the tool is of almost no practical
assistance.
To recap, there is a zone of personal use that is uncontroversially
noninfringing. That zone includes personal uses that are outside the scope of
copyright law, uses that come within express statutory exemptions and
privileges, and uses that have been found noninfringing by courts. The zone
also includes a bunch of other uses. Conventional analysis dictates that those
other uses are either infringing or fair use under § 107. If personal uses like
the ones I've listed can be described as "infringing," though, they are infringing only in the most nominal sense. If some copyright owner sued me,
my family, my friend, or my neighbor over those uses, the copyright owner
would lose. Copyright lawyers may disagree on what theory the copyright
owner should lose, but not about the ultimate result. 84 If that means that all
of the personal uses must be fair use, though, then that is possible only by
construing fair use to cover any use that is nominally but not enforceably
infringing, regardless of its purpose, the work's nature, the amount taken, and
the effect on the market. The minute we insist on applying fair use
consistently, the situation becomes even more unstable. My neighbor's
censored read-alouds are perhaps transformative; my hard disk backups are,
on the other hand, profoundly duplicative.
If fair use analysis doesn't resolve the lawfulness of personal use, then
the conventional story is misleading, at best. It is also, potentially, a dangerous story because it invites us to conclude that lawful personal uses that don't
fit the fair use rubric may be legal, but they shouldn't be. Instead, they must
be unprincipled exceptions that should not be allowed to spread. We are in
danger of obliterating lawful personal use because we've been pretending
that it isn't there.
V.

Copyright Rights Versus Copyright Liberties

I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.
-Jack Valenti, 1982185

183. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights in the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 547, 566 (1997) ("[T]he fair use analysis is extremely fact-specific, which means both that
it is hard to predict in advance and that it will be expensive to prove."); Litman, Reforming
Information Law, supra note 9, at 611-13 ("The potential chilling effect of having to go through
hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees in order to prevail after a trial on the merits can

be substantial.").
184. Cf Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Most honest citizens in the
modem world frequently engage, without hesitation, in trivial copying that, but for the de minimis
doctrine, would technically constitute a violation of law.").
185. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808,
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
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The fair use factors seem like a clumsy and unhelpful test for
ascertaining whether a particular personal use is lawful. If personal use has
value in the copyright system because it facilitates reading, listening,
viewing, and playing, moreover, evaluating personal uses under the fair use
test is likely to cause us to miss important distinctions between personal uses
we should encourage and personal uses we should be eager to prohibit. It
also makes it easy to mistake the degree to which current law permits or prohibits specific activity. Mapping out the contours of lawful personal use is,
thus, useful for two reasons. First, we will be better able to assess whether
the encroachment on personal use is a good thing or a bad one if we have a
more accurate picture of what is legal and illegal today. Second, any normative proposals on how we ought to treat personal use will be more effective if
they start with a more truthful picture of current law.
If the analysis derived from § 107 is not helpful in assessing the
lawfulness of particular personal uses, can we derive a better approach? Our
starting point should be the recognition that copyright law is intended to encourage reading as well as writing. Thus, I would argue, the nature and
scope of copyright liberties are relevant not only to the application of copyright privileges, exceptions, and defenses, but also to the construction of
copyright's exclusive rights. Courts that construed copyright's exclusive
rights to preserve copyright liberties, in other words, were doing precisely
what courts need to do to protect the copyright system from defeating its own
design.
The cases explored in Part III revealed that courts have sought to protect
copyright liberties by interpreting copyright law to draw a distinction
between exploitation and enjoyment of a copyrighted work. The law, they
insisted, gave copyright owners exclusive rights to control the former, but not
the latter. Congress has indicated repeatedly that it views copyright law this
way as well. Although Congress has significantly expanded the scope of
copyright rights, it has done so against a background understanding that the
law does and should protect copyright owners' ability to exploit their works,
while preserving the public's liberties to read, listen, view, or use those
works. Thus, Congress reacted to new technological opportunities to exploit
and infringe copyrighted works by expanding copyright to give owners rights
in new forms of exploitation, but without divesting people of historic copyright liberties to enjoy protected works. When Congress extended copyright
to sound recordings, members explained that the new reproduction right did
not affect the legality of consumers' copying recorded music.

86

When the

Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack
Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
186. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572
("[I]t is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from
tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use .... "); 117
CONG. REC. 34,748-49 (1971) (colloquy between Reps. Kastenmeier and Kazen) (confirming that
the bill excludes liability for personal home recording).
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specter of multiplying perfect digital copies of music persuaded Congress to
enact U.S. copyright law's first copy-protection mandate, it paired it with a
provision forbidding infringement suits against consumers
for making non87
commercial analog or digital copies of recorded music.'
When courts read § 106 rights broadly to reach commercial activity that
was arguably analogous to common personal uses, members of Congress
read those decisions to apply to exploitative and commercial acts without
calling personal uses into question. When the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, for example, decided that turning on a computer could infringe the
§ 106(1) reproduction right, 188 Congress amended the law to privilege computer maintenance and repair services' turning on of their customers'
computers. 189 It included no comparable provision allowing consumers to
turn on their own computers because of members' assumption that despite
the literal language of § 106, consumer computer use did not violate copyright owners' reproduction right.' 90 When the Register of Copyrights later
proposed legislation to add a narrow statutory privilege to make temporary
digital copies, representatives of the entertainment and software industries
objected.191 Rather than arguing that individuals who made such copies were

187. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000); see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
188. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the automatic transfer of copyrighted data from a storage medium, e.g., a hard drive, into a
computer's random access memory constitutes copyright infringement); supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
189. Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 301-02, 112
Stat. 2886, 2886-87 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117).
190. Senator Ashcroft's Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997,
one of the precursor bills to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, included a more general
exemption:
[I]t is not an infringement to make a copy of a work in a digital format if such
copying-(1) is incidental to the operation of a device in the course of the use of a
work otherwise lawful under this title; and (2) does not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the author.
S. 1146, 105th Cong. § 205 (1997); see 143 CONG. REC. 17,487-91 (1997) (describing exemption);
144 CONG. REC. 3,224-26 (1998) (same). The Senator was persuaded to endorse the narrower
amendment limited to computer repair businesses because only computer repair businesses had been
found liable for making RAM copies. 144 CONG. REC. 9,237, 9,250 (1998).
191. Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act directed the Copyright Office to
study the question (among others) and to submit a report to Congress within two years. In the 2001
report, the Copyright Office noted sharp division between proponents of a broad privilege to make
ephemeral RAM copies incidental to lawful use and opponents of any diminution in the scope of the
reproduction right. See DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 156, at 50-53. Representatives of
copyright owners had argued, the Copyright Office reported, that it was inappropriate to enact any
exception for the benefit of any user interest that had not demonstrated concrete harm from the
potentially overbroad application of § 106.
Id. at 55-56. Computer repair services had
demonstrated harm and Congress had accordingly enacted a narrow exception. Id. at 55. Since
others had not yet been held liable for making RAM copies, any statutory privilege was premature.
Id. at 56. After examining testimony and written comments on both sides, the Copyright Office had
concluded that the scope of the exclusive reproduction right was disputed:
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or should be liable under extant law, opponents of the legislation complained
that such an exemption might provide a loophole for unspecified future
commercial pirates. 192 When film studios sued the producers of software to
censor objectionable content on DVDs, 193 the Register of Copyrights testified
that she believed the manufacture, sale, and use of such software was completely legal.1 94 In response to the lawsuit, however, Congress enacted The
Family Movie Act, to immunize from liability "the making imperceptible, by
or at the direction of a member of a private household, of limited portions of
audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that household for private home viewing."1 9 5 The House
Committee Report emphasized that "copyright and trademark law should not
be used to limit a parent's right to control what their children watch in the
privacy of their own home," but characterized the law as a clarification
of
96
potential liability for companies that assisted parents in this pursuit.

Nonetheless, a general rule can be drawn from the language of the statute. In
establishing the dividing line between those reproductions that are subject to the
reproduction right and those that are not, we believe that Congress intended the
copyright owner's exclusive right to extend to all reproductions from which economic

value can be derived.
Id. at 111. RAM copies, the Office concluded, should generally be deemed to be fixed within the
meaning of the statute and therefore potentially infringing. Id. at 112-23. There was, however, no
evidence that anyone was bringing copyright infringement suits against consumers for such
copying, and the Office had concluded that consumer RAM copies would generally be deemed
noninfringing because of fair use or implied license. Id. at 124-45. The Register nonetheless
supported an amendment to clarify that no liability should attach to ephemeral copies that were
incidental to lawful music transmissions; music industry representatives insisted, however, that such
an amendment would be inappropriate since no showing of harm had been made. See, e.g., Digital
Millennium Copyright Act § 104 Report: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 76-85 (2001) [hereinafter 104
Report Hearing] (statement of Marvin Berenson, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Broadcast Music Inc.), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/107th/
76669.pdf.
192. See 104 Report Hearing, supra note 191, at 22, 17-23 (statement of Carey Ramos,
Attorney, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, on behalf of National Music Publishers
Association) ("[T]he line of demarcation between downloads and streams is already far from clear,
and is likely to be further blurred as new technologies and business models develop. It would be
unwise to codify an exemption for a technology that is rapidly changing."); id. at 46, 45-52
(statement of Emery Simon, Counsel, Business Software Alliance) ("If temporary copy exceptions
were somehow introduced... into law, we think this would create uncertainty.").
193. Complaint, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2002).
194. See The Family Movie Act: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2004)
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) ("[I]t seems clear to
me that under existing law this conduct and these products are lawful."); see also id. at 82
(statement of Rep. J. Randy Forbes, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Why shouldn't I
have that fundamental core right as a consumer to either say give me all of the 29th Division clips
from a movie that I want to find or, reverse, take out all the sexual items in that movie?").
195. Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201-02, 119 Stat. 223, 223 (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)).
196. H.R. REP. No. 109-33, pt. 1, at 5 (2005).
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My purpose is not to make a broad argument for the legality of all
personal uses under current law, but rather to reiterate that Congress has
consistently viewed copyright as securing copyright owners' opportunities 1to
97
exploit works without invading individuals' liberties to enjoy works.
Where individual activities have threatened to compete with or undermine
copyright owner exploitation, Congress has sometimes been amenable 1to
198
and sometimes not. 99
giving copyright owners enhanced legal weapons,
Congress has expressed its rationale in these cases as protecting copyright
businesses' commercial interests in exploiting their work.2 °°
When
organizations purporting to represent consumers have lobbied for explicit
consumer exemptions, members of Congress expressed skepticism that
courts would hold consumers liable for ordinary uses of copyrighted
works.20 '

197. See, e.g., Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003: Hearingon H.R. 107 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 107] (statement of Rep. Joe Barton,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce) ("[A]fter I buy a music video or a movie CD, it is
mine once I leave the store. Does that mean that I am under the impression that I have unlimited
rights? Of course not. I understand that I'm limited under existing law to activities that are not
commercial and I want to emphasize that, not commercial, or would come into competition with the
manufacturer of that product."); 144 CONG. REc. 18,771 (1998) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank)
("What we wanted to do was to come up with ways to adapt the protection of intellectual property
to a modem technological era, without unduly diminishing people's rights to enjoy things.").
198. See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2, 111 Stat. 2678, 2678 (1997)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (amending the term "financial gain" to include "receipt, or
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works");
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 802, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109) (amending § 109 to prohibit unauthorized rental of computer
programs); Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727, 1727
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109) (amending § 109 to prohibit unauthorized rental of phonorecords).
199. See LARDNER, supra note 81, at 173-227, 263-88 (describing the failure of attempts to
persuade Congress to enact laws protecting copyright owners from the VCR or video rental).
200. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-339, at 5 (1997) (asserting that the bill was intended to
prevent "willful conduct from destroying businesses, especially small businesses, that depend on
licensing agreements and royalties for survival"); The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 2, 1-3 (1998) (statement of Rep. Billy
Tauzin, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection)
("As electronic commerce develops, we as policymakers must indeed establish clear policy for
consumers, network and hardware providers, and copyright owners which protects the integrity and
value of electronic commerce.").
201. See, e.g., Hearingon H.R. 107, supra note 197, at 46-47 (statement of Rep. Cliff Steams,
Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce) ("So I ask you, Mr. Valenti, if the Supreme Court has
ruled that the right of the consumer to make a fair use of his own copies is there, why would you
deny that right, if the Supreme Court has ruled that?"); id. at 68-71 (colloquy) (discussing scope of
fair use privilege for consumer home copying); WIPO Copyright Treaties and Implementation Act
and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2180 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997).
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VI. A Geography of Personal Use
What we wanted to do was to come up with ways to adapt the protection
of intellectual property to a modem technological era without unduly
diminishing people's rights to enjoy things. We do not want to prevent the
public from having the enjoyment of these products.
-Representative

Barney Frank, 1998202

Even if everyone could agree that Congress intended to secure the
ability to exploit copyrighted works to copyright owners, while preserving
the copyright liberties that have enabled individuals to enjoy those works,
that wouldn't tell us how to resolve specific disputes. The line between exploitation and enjoyment has never been completely obvious, and it has
gotten more difficult to discern as networked digital technology enables ordinary people to engage in acts of mass dissemination at negligible expense.
Today, we see some authors reaching readers, composers connecting directly
with listeners, and photographers and filmmakers finding viewers without
help from traditional intermediaries; at the same time, ordinary Internet users
are disseminating works to one another.20 3
Personal uses, though, occupy the heart of copyright's historic liberties
to enjoy copyrighted works. Thus, the potential payoff from figuring out
how to draw the line in the right place for personal uses is large. Insisting
that personal uses deserve no special treatment under copyright law, in
contrast, poses huge risks of undermining copyright's historic liberties, and
with them the architecture implicit in the copyright system.
An individual who rips a CD to her iPod, turns on her brother's
computer, fast forwards through objectionable portions of a television show
or DVD, or plays music with the windows open isn't violating the copyright
20 4
law, despite the plain language of § 106. People disagree on the rationale.
It might be fair use; it might be implicitly licensed by copyright owners; it
might be that the harm caused by each consumer is de minimis, or it might
be, as I argue, that Congress intended the § 106 rights to be interpreted subject to the understanding that copyright prohibits unauthorized exploitation
but not unauthorized enjoyment. There's broad consensus that unauthorized
enjoyment is not and should not be illegal unless it crosses the line into exploitation or otherwise interferes with copyright owners' opportunities to
exploit their works. The difficulty is in telling the difference.

202. 144 CONG. REc. 18,771 (1998) (statement of Rep. Frank).
203. See Litman, Sharing, supra note 44, at 2-4, 27-30 (offering examples); see also Kurt
Hunt, Note, Copyright and YouTube: Pirate's Playground or Fair Use Forum?, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 2-8, on file with author)
(analyzing copyright implications of YouTube).
204. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, RIAA Says Ripping CDs to Your iPod is NOT Fair Use,
DEEP LINKS, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/004409.php (contrasting the
statement by RIAA counsel in the Grokster case that ripping a CD was "perfectly lawful" with the
later RIAA statement that ripping a CD is not fair use).
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People will disagree on the appropriate place to draw the line. More
than a decade of polarized debate on the proper scope of copyright doesn't
*
205
Supporters of strong copyright rights want to secure a zone
make it easier.
of safety surrounding copyright's exclusive rights both to ease copyright enforcement and to offer some protection in the event that technology delivers
new ways to exploit copyright loopholes. Opponents of enhanced copyright
protection, for their part, want to safeguard copyright liberties from erosion
and perceive the plea for enhanced copyright protection as unjustified
* 206
Perhaps, though, even if we can't reach agreement on where
grabbiness.
to locate the boundary between exploitation and enjoyment, we can agree on
the principles that should inform such a decision and the factors that might
bear on it.
One principle is the value of technology neutrality. Copyright owners
and Congress insist that they drafted the copyright law using general terms to
ensure that the scope of copyright could be independent of specific technological changes.20 7 Supporters of copyright enhancements maintain that
copyright owners need broader rights because technology has both enabled
new and exciting ways of dissemination and chipped away at their control of
their works.208 Technology has had comparable consequences for readers,
listeners, and viewers. It has created new and exciting ways to enjoy works
and eroded individual copyright liberties by enabling copyright owners to
control, meter, and prevent reading, listening, and viewing. Individuals'
claims that copyright liberties must be technology-independent should be no
less compelling than copyright owners'.
A second principle is the importance of balance. Copyright law is a law
for both writers and readers, for composers, performers, listeners, and
viewers. If the relationship between copyright's exclusive rights and its
liberties is unbalanced, then the writers or readers who feel ill-served by
copyright law will disrespect or disregard it. Writers and publishers might
bristle at suggestions that copyright should give them as much as they need
to persuade them to write and no more. Readers and listeners have at least as
much reason to resent suggestions that so long as they have some opportunity
to read or listen to copyrighted material, the system is working, 20 9 or that they

205. See generally Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture,
53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 101 (2006) (discussing the polarization in the "copyright war").
206. See generally id. at 103-11 (summarizing divergent views).
207. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. See
generally Litman, Copyright, supra note 160.
208. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 5, 115-16 ("[W]hen the exploitation of works shifts from
having copies to directly experiencing the content of the work, the author's ability to control access
becomes crucial.").
209. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 107, supra note 197, at 83, 80-83 (statement of Cary Sherman,
President, Recording Industry Association of America) ("[T]he marketplace is addressing what
consumers want and expect .... ).
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should look for preservation of their liberties to the grace or greed
of copy210
right owners, who will (eventually) do what the market demands.
Once upon a time, disseminating works of authorship entailed
significant capital investment, and discerning the difference between
publishers and readers, record labels and listeners was difficult only at the
margins, where intermediaries sought to facilitate the reading or listening
experience without a license. 211 The rapid growth of networked digital
technology, though, has put cheap mass dissemination within the reach of
individuals.1 2 At the same time, consumers have access to software tools
that permit them to alter and combine copies of copyrighted works in ways
that until recently were reserved to commercial businesses. 213 Individuals'
new abilities to engage in acts once the exclusive province of publishers,
record labels, film studios, and television broadcasters have blurred the line
between conventional exploitation of works of authorship and digitally enhanced enjoyment.214
If we are grounding the analysis of personal use in part on the extent to
which the use is best understood as akin to reading, listening, and their
cousins, then we need to reflect on what sorts of reading, listening, looking
at, using, running, playing, and building copyright seeks to encourage. How
broadly does copyright need its liberties to be drawn? We want people to be
able to interact with texts as well as absorb them.2 15 Clapping hands,
humming along, or playing a song on the piano all, technically, create
210. See, e.g., Consumer Benefits of Today's Digital Rights Management Solutions: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 107-10 (2002) (colloquy).
211. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (suit against
manufacturer of VCR that facilitated consumer copying); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394
(1974) (suit against operator of cable television system that enabled viewers to watch television
signals broadcast outside their local service area); Reese, supra note 57, at 16-25 (contrasting
current U.S. copyright law with earlier statutes).
212. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (tracing the rise of networked peer
production); Hunt, supra note 203 (describing YouTube and the copyright issues it implicates).
213. See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity,LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 133 (2007) (analyzing copyright implications of fan videos
disseminated over the Internet); Hunt, supra note 203 (describing the manipulation and
transformation of clips on YouTube).
214. See Liu, supra note 29, at 413, 412-14 ("[D]igital technology is changing both the
opportunities for, and costs of, engaging in this kind of communicative consumption."); Stadler,
supra note 58, at 945, 944-45 ("The most significant impact of technological advancement has been
the transformation of consumers into public distributors."); Hunt, supra note 203 (manuscript at 67) (describing different material posted on YouTube).
215. See Jessica Litman, Creative Reading: A Comment on Rebecca Tushnet's Payment in
Credit: Copyright Law andSubcultural Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175
(discussing the creativity involved in reading, listening, viewing, and playing); Stadler, supra note
58, at 946-47 (explaining the public value of individual copying); Tushnet, supra note 25, at 546
("Copies can still serve free speech purposes when their culture-altering and culture-constituting
effects aren't distilled into some new derivative work but remain in a viewer's mind or appear in her
conversation .... ").
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unlicensed derivative works, as do reading aloud, playacting, and imagining
a story's ending differently. They are nonetheless lawful by long tradition;
they're precisely the sorts of interaction with copyrighted works that promote
the Progress of Science. Nor does it make any copyright sense to limit
readers, listeners, and lookers to the reading and listening behaviors that were
customary in 1790. Just as technology spurs evolution in the creation and
marketing of works of authorship, it causes parallel evolution in the modes of
interaction with those works. We don't want to limit copyright owners to the
traditional marketing outlets of bookstore and sheet music sales. Similarly, it
makes no sense to limit readers, listeners, and players to pianos or analog
cassette tapes.
If the distinction between reading, listening, and viewing on one hand
and publishing, distributing, and broadcasting on the other is more of a
continuum, can we even draw a useful distinction between enjoyment and
exploitation? There will be difficult cases at the margin, but most personal
uses, which I defined earlier as uses made by individuals for themselves,
their families, or their close friends, will fall on the enjoyment side of the
line. That, without more, does not mean that we should presume them to be
lawful. It does, however, suggest that we deem them unlawful only at some
cost to the fabric and purposes of copyright law. We should think carefully
about whether the impact of such uses on core copyright owner incentives is
sufficiently substantial to be worth chipping away at important copyright
liberties.
We can appropriate some useful insights from older cases that sought to
parse the statute to advance both. Those courts focused on whether the allegedly infringing uses were more akin to exploiting the copyrighted works
or enjoying them. In making this determination, some courts sought to
evaluate the impact of the accused activity on individuals' opportunities to
read, listen, and view as well as on authors and publishers' incentives to
write, compose, publish, and perform. I suggest that when we look at the
lawfulness of personal uses, we need to situate particular personal uses on the
continuum between exploitation and enjoyment. As part of that inquiry, we
should evaluate both the uses' potential to undermine core copyright incentives and their potential to enhance essential copyright liberties of reading,
viewing, listening, and their kin. Conversely, will prohibiting the uses be
likely either to meaningfully enhance core copyright incentives or undermine
essential copyright liberties?
A. The Impact of ParticularPersonal Uses on Copyright Incentives and
Liberties
In order to evaluate whether particular personal uses should, as a
normative matter, be lawful, it is useful to look at the likely effects of the use
on copyright incentives, and the degree the use is likely to enhance what I
have called historic copyright liberties. Some personal uses will significantly
undermine copyright incentives without enhancing reading, viewing, or
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listening. Those uses, it seems to me, are uses we should feel comfortable in
deeming infringing. Some uses will pose little threat to copyright incentives
while greatly enhancing copyright liberties, and those uses should almost
always be deemed legal, whether they line up with conventional fair use
analysis or not. Personal uses that neither contribute to the exercise of copyright liberties nor undermine core copyright incentives are more problematic
to classify, but little turns on whether we get the answer wrong. Uses that
both enhance reading, listening, using, running, and playing, and also
threaten to significantly undermine copyright incentives are, and should be,
the most difficult uses to resolve, and may require sensitive and careful
balancing. In works and markets for which copyright owner incentives are
abundant, the core purposes of copyright should counsel permitting uses that
advance copyright liberties.
The only doctrinal tool in copyright law currently in common use for
evaluating the plausible impact of a use on copyright incentives is the fair use
test, which is problematic in this context for all of the reasons I discussed in
the last Part. I don't, however, urge that we revise the fair use test to incorporate these considerations as supplementary factors.21 6 In my view, the
problem is less that fair use has grown too narrow, than that our conception
of the exclusive rights granted in § 106 has grown too broad.2 17 I suggest,
therefore, that we need to take another look at whether particular personal
uses in fact invade the exclusive rights to exploit copyrighted works conferred in § 106.
Some of the considerations that inform a fair use
determination, though, seem to have relevance to the question where a use
sits on the spectrum between exploitation and enjoyment.
There seems to be a strong social consensus in the United States, for
example, that copyright owners should be able to control the
commercialization of their works. 218 The commercial nature of a use
216. Several legal scholars have proposed expanding or rethinking fair use in ways that might
accommodate an enhanced personal use exemption. Their analyses would stretch or reformulate
fair use to clarify its application to customary personal uses. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 29, at
1026 ("To the extent that private copying expands access to existing works without decreasing the
copyright owner's revenues and the resulting incentive to create additional works, private copying is
Pareto optimal and should constitute a fair use."); Deborah Tussey, supra note 28, at 1129
(proposing adoption of a defined, limited personal use exemption). But see Michael J. Madison,
Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 414
(2005) ("[Flair use is not the place for the personal as such.").
217. Accord Stadler, supra note 58, at 956 ("The problem underlying both of these
interpretations of 'fair use' is that the property rights to which it makes exception have grown
increasingly, even unmanageably broad.").
218. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 209 (1986) (reporting that an OTA commissioned survey reveals

that majority of respondents finds copying for personal use to be acceptable and copying for
commercial purposes to be unacceptable); THE POLICY PLANNING GROUP, YANKELOVICH, SKELLY
& WHITE, INC., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS" ISSUE (1985)

(OTA Contractor Report describing survey in detail); see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,

supra note 7, at 163-65 (1989) (describing a survey where respondents generally agreed that it was
improper to commercialize the work of another).
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captures something important about the public's impression of the nature of
the copyright bargain. If a use is intended for commercial gain, it seems reasonable to share some portion of that gain with the copyright owner;
moreover, if a use involves commercial exploitation of a work, it seems more
likely to collide with the copyright owner's exploitation. Thus, a commercial
use is more likely than a noncommercial one to interfere with the incentives
promised by the Copyright Act.
Recent analyses of the commercial nature of personal uses, however,
have seen unprincipled expansion of the meaning of the term.2 1 9 In A&M
Records v. Napster, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that people who used
the Napster file sharing software made commercial use of copyrighted works
because "repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works
were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies., 220 In Arista
Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., the court concluded that individuals who
used an Internet search engine to find online sources for music files were
making commercial use of the files they searched for because they
"profit[ed] from the exploitation of the copyrighted work without paying the
customary prices.", 22 1 What seems to have distracted courts222 in the online
context into a violent expansion of the meaning of "commercial" is the perception that multiple, individual noncommercial online uses can combine to
make something that seems commercial in scale and threatens to undermine
223
If
commercially.
works she
to exploit
owners'
copyright
would otherwise
something
for free their
a person to get
allowsopportunities
any use that

219. See Michael J. Meurer, Too Many Markets or Too Few? Copyright Policy Towards
Shared Works, 77 S.CAL. L. REV. 903, 952 (2004) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's expansive view
of commercial use); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 502-03 (2005) (criticizing holdings that have taken commercial use
beyond its logical extreme).
220. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); see also A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,rev 'd in part,239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Moreover, the fact that Napster users get for free something they would
ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from Napster use.").
221. Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165,
at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
222. Arguably, Congress is guilty of something analogous in connection with criminal
copyright infringement. See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(a), 111 Stat.
2678, 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)) (expanding the
definition of "financial gain"). See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization
Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783,
788-806 (2005) (using cost-benefit analysis to evaluate broadened criminalization of copyright
infringement).
223. In the context of a fair use inquiry, though, that observation implicates the fourth fair use
factor, which asks what effect the use might have on the effect on the market for the copyrighted
work. Using it to transform noncommercial personal uses into commercial ones under the first fair
use factor and then noting its effect on the market in considering the fourth factor is double
counting. See Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The "Transformative" Use Doctrine After
Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (2002) (critiquing the practice of double counting,
particularly in Dr.Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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need to pay for is a commercial one, though, then most lawful unlicensed
uses would be commercial. Defining commercial use so broadly makes it
useless as a sorting tool. In order to help us distinguish permissible from impermissible uses, we need to define commercial use narrowly enough to
capture direct financial gain and exclude more indirect benefit.
Whether a use might compete with uses licensed by the copyright owner
is a factor that has been important to a number of courts in evaluating the
lawfulness of personal uses.224 That's appropriate: a use that competes with a
copyright owner's program of exploitation has the potential to undermine the
copyright owners' incentives significantly. At the same time, we don't want
to presume that every time a copyright owner devises a new license, that fact
without more transforms historical lawful uses into unlawful ones. Apple's
iTunes store's sale of downloadable Desperate Housewives episodes did not
make the users of videocassette recorders into infringers, nor should it have.
We need to give the analysis of competitive uses more serious attention than
simply accepting assertions that any time a person gets for free something
that she might otherwise buy, she has damaged the copyright owner's market
by displacing a sale. As Glynn Lunney has pointed out, we've assumed the
unlawfulness of much personal use without trial or rigorous analysis because
we've been too ready to equate free goods with displaced sales.225
Unless we assume that the optimum incentive for copyright owners is
boundless, the fact that a use of a work could be monetized if making it
without a license were made illegal should not without more persuade us that
we need to give the use into copyright owners' control.226 On the other hand,
where a personal use competes with commercial uses at the heart of the
copyright owner's exploitation of its works, the use's potential to undermine
important copyright incentives should be a cause for concern.
The commercial and potentially competitive nature of specific personal
uses seems relevant to an assessment of the use's likely effects on copyright
incentives. Neither aspect, though, tells us much about the use's potential to
enhance copyright liberties. In order to compare the use's impact on
copyright, we need to look at other considerations.
Some of these
considerations are intuitively as appealing as the commercial or competitive

224. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450-54 (1984)
(examining evidence that time shifting might undermine the market for television programming).
225. See Lunney, supra note 29, at 983 ("[U]nauthorized copying, again unlike theft, becomes
socially undesirable only when it goes so far as to threaten the public's interest in an adequate
supply of creative works."); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 936-39
(1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion because photocopying had no
measurable effect on the publishers' market); Sam Hughes, The Piracy Calculator,
http://qntm.org/owe ("What's your illegal hoard worth? What's the street value of all your pirated
MP3s and movies? How much would the RI/MPAA demand - minimum - if they sued you? Find

out!").
226. See Sara K. Stadler, Incentives and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 47378 (2007) (arguing that the appropriate level of copyright incentive is both a policy question and an
empirical one).
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nature of the use. For example, one important question is whether the
specific use is private. The statute expressly exempts private distributions,
performances, and displays, but not private copies or adaptations. The same
considerations that have so far discouraged Congress from making private
distributions, performances, and displays actionable often accompany private
copies and adaptations. So long as a person's use is private, its impact on the
copyright owner's exploitation of her work is likely to be limited, while its
contribution to the person's reading, listening, or viewing may be significant.
In addition, permitting private uses advances important copyright and
noncopyright interests. Julie Cohen has written several articles exploring the
idea of "intellectual privacy." 227 Intellectual privacy advances liberty by giving us freedom to think without surveillance and is a crucial aspect of any
liberty worth having. The ability to read works without surveillance may, for
some works and some readers, be key to being able to read them at all.
Another consideration that is intuitively appealing is whether the
personal use is incidental to some other use, and, if so, whether that primary
use is permissible, either because it is exempt or because it is licensed.2 28
Incidental uses occupy the core of the sort of personal use that copyright law
should encourage. If one purpose of copyright law is to encourage creation
and dissemination of works of authorship, and another goal is to advance
reading, listening, viewing, and playing of those works, uses that facilitate
authorized reading, listening, and viewing have a very strong claim for
copyright's solicitude. Because incidental uses are secondary to uses that are
either excluded from the copyright owner's bundle of rights or already otherwise licensed, they pose little threat of undermining copyright incentives.
For much of copyright law's history, it was conventional to treat many
incidental uses as impliedly licensed.2 29 Music publishers first exploited their
public performance right by licensing public performance with the sale of
copies. The initial justification for what became the jukebox exemption was
that the public performance of music on coin-operated devices was purely

227. See Julie E. Cohen, Comment: Copyright's Public-PrivateDistinction, 55 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 963 (2005) (discussing the importance of user privacy to copyright law); Julie E. Cohen,
DRM andPrivacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 582 (2003) (defining intellectual privacy); Cohen,
A Right to Read, supra note 23 (positing a constitutional privacy and autonomy interest for readers).
228. The incidental nature of many RAM copies was a key factor persuading the Register of
Copyrights that most of them should be deemed noninfringing. DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note
156, at 130-46; see supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. Similar considerations seemed to
be at work in the Fortnightly and Sony decisions, discussed earlier. In both cases, the Court
emphasized that defendant merely facilitated consumers watching programming that they were
entitled to view. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1968); see also Teleprompter
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that "extending the range of viewability of a broadcast
program" did not constitute a performance).
229. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernaliaof the Digital Age, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 13-31 (1996) (discussing implied licenses).
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promotional, for the purpose of selling copies of sheet music. 23° Radio and
later television broadcasters commonly made temporary copies of licensed
material to facilitate broadcasts, on the assumption that such copies were
within the scope of the license.23'
In the digital realm, the results have been different. When the company
MP3.com purchased and copied CDs to facilitate licensed streaming of the
musical works recorded on them, it was held liable for willful
infringement.2 32 MP3.com argued that its purchase of a performing rights
license carried with it an implied license to reproduce the works insofar as
necessary to perform them. 3 The court disagreed. 3 4 MP3.com's licensors
had no authority to grant an implied reproduction license, and therefore could
not have done so:
"Performance" and "reproduction" are clearly and unambiguously
separate rights under the Copyright Act of 1976. Here, the performing
rights licenses themselves, as their name implies, explicitly authorize
public performance only, do not purport to grant a reproduction right
in musical compositions, and, in at least one case, expressly disclaim
such a grant. Moreover, the performing rights societies themselves
do
235
not, and do not purport to have, the authority to grant such a right.
More generally, a person licensed to use a copyrighted work can no
longer rely on that license to make other uses that are incidental to or
necessary for the use covered by the license. Since copyrights are infinitely
divisible, and rights are commonly divided and separately controlled, there's
no reason to think that the licensor of the licensed right has the authority to
license the incidental use, impliedly or otherwise.
The chaos wrought by divisible copyright is impeding licensing of
online content even for businesses well supplied with copyright lawyers. 236
While courts might once have inferred permission for activity incidental to a
licensed use, they now face the obstacle that the owner of the licensed right
230. See Litman, War Stories, supra note 6, at 352 (tracing the history of the jukebox
exemption).
231. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE

U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, at 44-47 (Comm. Print 1965). Congress later
incorporated an express ephemeral recording privilege for licensed broadcasters in the 1976
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
232. See Country Road Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that defendant is liable for willful copyright infringement).
233. Id. at 327.
234. Id. at 328.
235. Id. at 327-28 (citations and footnote omitted).
236. See generally Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 4-21 (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright
Office) (arguing that new digital methods of distribution required reassessing statutory licensing
schemes); Loren, supra note 56, at 674 ("Even ventures backed by the major record companies are
having a difficult time getting off the ground.").
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may not own the right to authorize the incidental use. Exacerbating the
problem is the copyright fashion to claim that any digital use of a work necessarily implicates multiple distinct copyright rights, each of which may be
separately owned.23 7 The need to secure several licenses for a single use of
any given work has stymied efforts to launch licensed online businesses and
driven unlicensed start-ups into bankruptcy. Negotiations to amend the
copyright law to solve this set of problems, though, have stalled as competing copyright owners try to ensure they get the largest slices of pie. 8
We can leave them to sort it out among themselves. For the purposes of
personal use, we should avail ourselves of a simplifying solution. Since
treating copyrights as if they were plots of real estate, subject to subdivision
and separate exploitation, has caused the problem, we can look to basic property law for its way out of the problem. The property law solution to this sort
of mess is the easement by implication. 239 If Abel carves Blackacre up into
teeny tiny plots so that Baker can build a mess of ticky-tacky houses, but
draws the lines so that half the houses have no access to the road, the law
implies an easement to enable the purchasers of the remote lots to reach the
highway, because road access is a necessary incident to enjoyment of the
land ownership. Without road access, how could purchasers move into their
ticky-tacky houses? Copyrights are unitary before they are divided. If the
author or her assignee chooses to convey the reproduction, adaptation, public
distribution, public performance, and public display rights to separate
entities, it makes sense to presume that she conveys with each distinct
exclusive right the power to engage in uses incidental to that right, even if
they implicate other exclusive rights.
In particular, we should deem noninfringing any personal uses that are
merely incidental to the exercise of historic copyright liberties to read, listen
to, or see. Thus, even if one concurs with the line of cases that holds that any
appearance of a work in a computer's random access memory is a fixed and
therefore infringing reproduction, 240 RAM copies made in the course of
237. See Litman, Sharing, supra note 44, at 13-23 (describing problems caused by Congress's
adoption of copyright divisibility); Loren, supra note 56, at 678 (suggesting that the need to
negotiate multiple licenses hampers innovation); see also United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (In re Am. Online), No. 41-1395, slip op. at 11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007)
("Although the Act's classification provisions are non-exclusive and it is thus theoretically possible
for the same transmission to constitute both a public performance and a reproduction,.... we can
discern no basis for ASCAP's sweeping construction of § 101.").
238. See Audio Recording: State of the Union Panel Discussion at the Future of Music
Coalition Fifth Annual Policy Summit (Sept. 12, 2005), availableat http://www.futureofmusic.org/
audio/summit05/panelO4.stateofunion.mp3.
239. See, e.g., Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156 (Me. 1993) (holding that an implied right of
access had been created by necessity); Soltis v. Miller, 282 A.2d 369 (Pa. 1971) (holding that an
implied right of way over adjacent property existed in order to gain access to a public way).
240. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys.
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999); see supra note 174.
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reading an ebook, watching a DVD, or listening to a CD should not infringe,
whether or not the copies come within an express exemption in §§ 107, 117,
or 1008.
B. The Lawfulness of Personal Uses
When we analyze whether to treat personal uses as exploitation or
enjoyment, we should pay attention to the extent to which they advance
essential copyright liberties of reading, listening, and viewing, as well as the
extent to which they undermine copyright incentives. The degree to which
personal uses are commercial, competitive, private, or incidental to other
lawful uses reveals their tendency to do both of these things.
A healthy copyright system requires an equilibrium between copyright
owners' rights to exploit works and individuals' liberties to enjoy them. The
realm of personal use is where the need for balance between those interests is
most acute. Personal uses that are public, that are commercial, or that compete with copyright owner exploitation seem like attractive candidates to
bring within the realm of copyright owner control, while personal uses that
are private, noncommercial, or incidental to uses that are either licensed or
require no license seem like uses that should be treated as beyond the scope
of copyright owner control. If we construe the language of § 106 to reflect
the distinction between copyright owner exploitation and reader, listener, and
viewer liberties, then it becomes clear that many personal uses should not be
deemed reproductions, adaptations, or public distributions, performances, or
displays within the meaning of the statute. Because Congress and copyright
lobbyists alike assumed that copyright law reflected that distinction, nobody
thought it necessary to enact express privileges for personal use of the sort
included in the laws of other jurisdictions. Indeed, when pressed more
recently, to consider explicit exemptions for personal use, some members of
Congress expressed surprise that anyone would interpret copyright law to
constrain reading, listening, or other personal uses.24' Technological progress has made the difference between exploitation and enjoyment more
difficult to draw. That difficulty is threatening for copyright owners, since
they see technology's potential to undermine their opportunities to exploit
the works they create. Copyright owners' loud voices on this subject have
allowed many of us to overlook the same difficulty's potential to undermine
copyright liberties to read, listen, view, and play. If reading is as central to
copyright as writing, though, narrowing copyright liberties will be as destructive to the overall fabric of copyright law as undermining copyright
incentives.

241. See, e.g., Hearingon H.R. 107, supra note 197, at 45-63 (colloquy).
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VII. "All Rights Reserved"
The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a view to
effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to be unduly
extended by judicial construction to include privileges not intended to be
conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to their
benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant.
-Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908)
In Sony v. Universal Studios, Justice Blackmun argued in his
memoranda to the other Justices that the 1976 Copyright Act gave copyright
owners the exclusive right to reproduce their works and that any reproduction
not otherwise permitted by an explicit statutory exemption was therefore
infringing.24 2 Justice Blackmun looked at the history of Supreme Court cases
interpreting the scope of copyright narrowly, and argued that Congress had
intended, in enacting the 1976 Act, to dissuade courts from constrained
readings of copyright rights.243 There were no implicit copyright privileges
or exemptions, Justice Blackmun argued, which meant that unauthorized uses
that did not fall within an express statutory provision were unlawful unless
they were fair use.244 Fair use, further, was a narrow privilege limited to productive uses; as a general matter, copyright owners should not be forced to
245
subsidize ordinary uses. 4 Justice Blackmun lost that argument and went on
to write the dissent in Sony.246 Copyright scholars, however, have by and
large adopted Justice Blackmun's analysis of the meaning and structure of
the 1976 Act. The statute is so long and so detailed that we deny the exisAny reproduction or
tence of implied privileges or exemptions.24 7
adaptation, any public distribution, performance, or display is a prima facie
infringement unless it248is covered by a specific exemption or limitation or
privileged by fair use.
That's not true, of course, unless one believes in a generous and
expansive version of fair use that it would be hard to find in any recent
judicial opinions. We all routinely engage in activity that would be unlawful
under such an understanding. We back up our hard disks; we forward emails
242. Memorandum of Justice Harry Andrew Blackmun to the Justices of the 1983 U.S.
Supreme Court at 17-18 (June 1983) (on file with author).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 19.
245. Id. at 22-23.
246. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457-500 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247. See Litman, Technological Change, supra note 20, at 349 ("[Tlhe language of the 1976
Act discouraged the courts from discovering implied privileges, by couching its multiplicity of
express privileges in such specificity and detail.").
248. See, e.g.,

SHELDON W. HALPERN,

DAVID

E.

SHIPLEY & HOWARD

B. ABRAMS,

COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 201 (1992) ("[T]he structural approach of the Copyright Act
is to define five broad basic rights and to provide a detailed list of specific exemptions, exclusions
and compulsory licenses.").
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to friends. We read aloud to our children using funny voices for different
characters; we play CDs on our car stereos with our windows open.
What does that matter, given that nobody is likely to file suit over
personal uses? The recent lawsuits against thousands of individuals caught
using peer-to-peer file trading software might warn against relying too much
on the seeming unthinkability of individual lawsuits over personal use.
Assuming, however, that personal use lawsuits are hugely unlikely, what
harm does it do to frame the statutory interpretation question that way?
One significant harm that flows from conceptualizing the statute in that
way is that, if it is inaccurate, it warps our thinking. It encourages copyright
owners to expect too much, and copyright scholars to demand too little. It
snookers judges into reinterpreting the language of the statute to give effect
to the perceived intent of Congress, expanding copies to include RAM
copies,249 and commercial uses to include any use a copyright owner might
otherwise charge for.250 It shortchanges the readers, listeners, viewers,
watchers, players, and builders at the heart of the copyright system.
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that members
of Congress intended to transform copyright from a grant of limited
exclusive rights into an expansive monopoly over all uses of copyrighted
works. As recently as ten years ago, a suggestion that a literal reading of the
statute in light of recent cases might give copyright owners control over
reading, listening, and other personal uses seemed outlandish. Today, it increasingly seems to be inevitable, even though the underlying statutory
language hasn't changed. Part of the blame belongs at our own doors. When
scholars insisted that uses are unlawful unless expressly exempted, lawyers
and courts may have believed us; we may have believed ourselves.

249. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Since
we find that the copy created in the RAM can be 'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated,' we hold that the loading of software into RAM creates a copy under the Copyright
Act.").
250. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912-15 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that Napster file sharing, though
noncommercial in nature, adversely affects the copyrighted work's potential market by decreasing
music sales, depriving publishers of royalties, and harming the record company's potential entry
into the online market).
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